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NOTES
Sarbanes-Oxley and Small Business:
Section 404 and the Case for a Small
Business Exemption
I.

INTRODUCTION

A frantic bull market propelled the stock market to
dizzying heights and brought unprecedented paper wealth to a
broad cross-section of Americans. 1 A catastrophic stock market
collapse followed, wiping out a large percentage of stock
investors’ wealth and heralding the start of a recession.
Widespread revelations of fraud and deception, both by
companies and their financial advisors, wrecked confidence in
the capital markets and the economy as a whole. Widespread
public outcry and demands for change created a congressional
mandate to make drastic changes to the existing system of
protections for investors in the stock market.
This story describes two time periods, 70 years apart,
that saw tremendous upheaval in the U.S. stock markets and
the economy as a whole. Two sets of congressional hearings, 70
years apart, were held in response to widespread public
outrage regarding massive losses in the stock markets and
pervasive corporate fraud that led to the bankruptcies of some
of America’s largest corporations. Two sets of laws, 70 years
apart, shaped the federal securities regulations in the United
States.
The first set of hearings took place in the 1930s and led
to the creation of the federal securities laws, 2 while the second
1
Arthur M. Louis, Individual Investors Gaining Status, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRON., Dec. 28, 1999, at D1 (stating that “[I]ndividuals entered the stock market in
great numbers for the first time during the widespread economic prosperity that began
in the mid-1920s. The value of stocks owned by individuals swelled to $5 billion in 1929
from less than $2 billion at the start of the decade.”) Similarly, by the end of 1999,
more than 50% of U.S. households owned stocks. At that time, those holdings had a
total value of approximately $10 trillion. Id.
2
JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 1 (3d
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set of hearings in 2001 and 2002 resulted in the most sweeping
changes to the federal securities laws since their enactment. 3
Each time, the result was new federal securities rules and
regulations that were designed to prevent future fraud and
financial losses. 4 The most recent overhaul – the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 5 – is the most aggressive and prescriptive
securities law in the world today. 6 It not only expands on the
existing laws’ underlying philosophy of full and fair disclosure, 7
but goes further to dictate how companies must be organized
and what procedures companies must use to ensure
compliance. 8 This note will focus on this last type of regulation,
ed. 2003) (“The Securities and Exchange Commission was created at the conclusion of
the Senate Banking and Currency Committee’s 1932-1934 investigation of stock
exchange practices . . . .”).
3
President George W. Bush, Remarks on Signing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1283, 1284 (July 30, 2002) (stating that the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act represents “the most far-reaching reforms of American business
practices since the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt”). See also 1 CORPORATE FRAUD
RESPONSIBILITY: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, at v
(William H. Manz ed., 2003) [hereinafter Manz] (describing Sarbanes-Oxley as “the
most far-reaching reform of American business practices since the Great Depression”).
4
SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 2 (stating that the purpose of the hearings was
to prevent another stock market crash).
5
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 – An Act to protect investors by improving the
accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws,
and for other purposes, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Sarbanes-Oxley].
6
See Joel Seligman, A Comment on Accounting and Auditing, 47 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 967, 969 (2003) (regarding the disclosure requirements and accounting
standards of the United States after Sarbanes-Oxley as the most rigorous in the world).
See also Bryan Frith, National Australia Bank Faces Big Brother’s Rule Call, THE
AUSTRALIAN, Feb. 27, 2004, at 21 (stating that the United States was already the
world’s most heavily regulated corporate jurisdiction even before Sarbanes-Oxley
added additional regulations and restrictions); Jill P. Giles et al., The PCAOB and
Convergence of the Global Auditing and Accounting Profession, THE CPA JOURNAL,
Sept. 1, 2004, at 36 (stating that the SEC governs the world’s most heavily regulated
market).
7
See Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC,
56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 5 (2003) (calling disclosure the “prevailing regulatory strategy in
the securities markets”); Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some
Lessons for Law from Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated
Customers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 627, 670 (1996) (describing disclosure as securities law’s
“favorite strategy”); Marc Levy, Japanese and U.S. Financial Derivatives Markets:
Recommendations for Loosening Japan’s Tightly Regulated Market, 18 FORDHAM INT’L
L.J. 1970, 1990 n.143 (1995) (stating that the SEC emphasizes disclosure as an
enforcement strategy).
8
See Boardroom Burdens: U.S. Corporate Governance Reforms Are a
Necessary Evil, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), June 4, 2004, at 16 (“Congressional legislation is
highly prescriptive and lacks . . . flexibility . . . .”); John Berlau, Sarbanes-Oxley Is
Business
Disaster,
INSIGHT
MAG.,
Jan.
22,
2004,
http://www.insightmag.com/news/2004/02/03/National/SarbanesOxley.Is.Business.Disa
ster-582737.shtml (stating that Sarbanes-Oxley prescribes a “one-size-fits-all”
approach that applies to nearly all public companies).
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which dictates an inflexible standard without regard for the
fundamental differences in companies of different sizes.
Congress passed Sarbanes-Oxley in the summer of
2002, in the wake of the financial scandals at Enron 9 and
WorldCom. 10 The abbreviated process that spawned this
sweeping legislation, however, ignored the potential
unintended consequences of the law on small businesses, such
as the high relative costs of complying with its new
requirements. 11 Sarbanes-Oxley’s most problematic provisions
apply uniformly to almost all publicly held companies. 12 The
9
Enron began in the 1980s as a traditional energy company but quickly
expanded its interests under the guidance of its top executives with investments in
such varied projects as a British water business and a Brazilian power distributor. In
order to hide these and other questionable investments, Enron used increasingly
complex and risky off-balance sheet devices to provide financing and liquidity for its
expansion plans while disguising the true amount of debt that the company was
carrying. Eventually, the house of cards that Enron had built collapsed under the
weight of declining asset values and its own deception. In October 2001, the company
announced unexpected quarterly losses and a drastic reduction in shareholder equity.
In November 2001, energy concern Dynegy agreed to buy Enron for $9 billion in stock
and the assumption of $13 billion of debt. After discovering the extent of Enron’s
disastrous finances, however, Dynegy walked away from the merger. Four days later,
Enron filed the second-largest bankruptcy in United States history. See Richard A.
Oppel, Jr. & Riva D. Atlas, Enron’s Collapse: The Overview; Hobbled Enron Tried to
Stay on Its Feet, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2001, at C1; Wendy Zellner et al., The Fall of
Enron, BUS. WK., Dec. 17, 2001, at 30; Alex Berenson & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Rival to
Buy Enron, Top Energy Trader, After Financial Fall, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2001, at A1.
For a description of the complex financial maneuvers used by Enron to disguise its true
financial condition, see Rebecca Smith & John R. Emshwiller, Combination of
Brilliance, Overconfidence Helped Enron Fly High and Plummet Fast, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 8, 2001, at A1.
10
WorldCom, once the nation’s second largest telecommunications firm, also
went to great lengths to disguise its true financial condition. Its senior management
engaged in massive accounting fraud by hiding debt, double-counting revenues and
failing to record expenses. Shortly after WorldCom’s CEO, Bernard Ebbers, resigned
in April 2002, new management began to unravel the tangled web of the company’s
finances. In June 2002, the company announced that it had uncovered $3.8 billion in
“accounting irregularities” and fired the architect of the accounting fraud, CFO Scott
Sullivan. Less than one month later, WorldCom filed the largest bankruptcy in United
States history. See Charles Haddad et al., WorldCom’s Sorry Legacy, BUS. WK., July 8,
2002, at 38; Patrick McGeehan, Grubman Attended 10 Board Meetings, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 10, 2002, at C2; Steven Rosenbush et al., Inside the Telecom Game, BUS. WK.,
Aug. 5, 2002, at 34; Jared Sandberg et al., WorldCom Internal Probe Uncovers Massive
Fraud, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2002, at A1.
11
See infra notes 217-34 and accompanying text.
12
Sarbanes-Oxley amended numerous sections of both the Securities Act of
1933 (15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2005)) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a-78mm (2005)). See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley § 2(a)(10)(A)(i) (amending Securities
Act of 1933 § 19(b)); Sarbanes-Oxley § 2(a)(15) (amending Securities Exchange Act of
1934 § 3(a)(47)); Sarbanes-Oxley § 401(a) (amending Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §
13). See also Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William O. Douglas: The
Securities and Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 79, 133 (2005) (“Federal regulation under Sarbanes-Oxley, on the other
hand, is proscriptive and applies to all public companies regardless of their size, age, or
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law also ignores the special needs and concerns of small
publicly held companies in the economy as well as the wellestablished precedent for creating special provisions in federal
regulations for small businesses. 13
This note will argue that the current state of the law
does not properly balance two prominent national interests –
protection of investors and encouragement of small business
growth. 14 In doing so, this note will propose a partial small
business exemption from Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404, the
section which establishes the framework for the mandatory
reports on a company’s internal controls that must be prepared
This
by the company’s management and its auditors. 15
proposed small business exemption would be based on the
same policies and rationale as Regulation D, a federal
securities law exemption that allows some securities offerings
to be made without registering with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”). 16 Regulation D is a partial
exemption that benefits small issuers by permitting them to
avoid the substantial costs of registration when selling
In doing so, Regulation D maintains other
securities. 17
limitations on the issuer that prevent fraud and protect
business structure.”); Berlau, supra note 8 (“Sarbanes-Oxley goes where the federal
government has never gone before in securities regulation, not just prohibiting conduct
but prescriptively . . . dictating one-size-fits-all processes for testing internal controls
for nearly all public companies.”).
13
See, e.g., Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (2005) [hereinafter
RFA]. Congress enacted the RFA in 1980 as part of its continued attentiveness to the
problems of small business. The RFA requires agencies to consider regulatory
alternatives that are less burdensome to small businesses. Paul R. Verkuil, A Critical
Guide to the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 1982 DUKE L.J. 213, 216-30 (1982).
14
15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2005) (stating that the Securities and Exchange
Commission endeavors to protect investors and promote efficient capital markets). See
also Karmel, supra note 12, at 144 (stating that two important justifications for federal
securities regulation are to protect the savings of millions of workers with reasonable
safeguards and to promote capital formation by fostering investor confidence).
15
Sarbanes-Oxley § 404 (codified in 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2005)) [hereinafter
Section 404]. See also JAMES HAMILTON & N. PETER RASMUSSEN, GUIDE TO INTERNAL
CONTROLS UNDER SECTION 404 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT 11-12 (2004).
16
17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-230.508 (2005) [hereinafter Regulation D]. See also
Securities Act Release No. 33-6389, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 83,106 (Mar. 8, 1982) [hereinafter Release No. 33-6389] (adopting the final
rules for Regulation D and stating that “[t]he new regulation is designed to simplify
and clarify existing exemptions, to expand their availability, and to achieve uniformity
between Federal and state exemptions in order to facilitate capital formation
consistent with the protection of investors.”).
17
Mark A. Sargent, The New Regulation D: Deregulation, Federalism and the
Dynamics of Regulatory Reform, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 225, 239 (1990) (“The SEC . . .
intended the substantive provisions of the Regulation [D] to relieve issuers of
substantial costs.”).
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investors, such as restrictions on the number and type of
investors that can buy the securities. 18 While the proposed
exemption in this note differs from Regulation D in that the
proposed exemption is based on the size of the company and
not the size of the transaction, 19 both exemptions alleviate some
of the costly burden of regulatory compliance on small
companies. At the same time, both exemptions also preserve
antifraud liability, including liability under the strengthened
The proposed
provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 20
exemption will allow small companies to access capital for
growth while continuing to protect investors and deter
corporate fraud.
Part II of this note will describe briefly the Securities
Act of 1933 21 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 22 by
explaining the history and circumstances under which they
became law. Part III will then define “small business” and
describe the role that small businesses play in the American
economy. This section will also explain why small businesses
have historically received special treatment in federal
regulations by analyzing one significant small business
exemption – Regulation D of the Securities Act of 1933. Part
IV of this note will describe the history and impetus behind the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and compare the environments in which
Sarbanes-Oxley and the Securities and Exchange Acts were
passed. 23 Part IV will also examine Section 404’s requirements,
document the drastic costs involved with Section 404
compliance, and scrutinize the process that Congress used to
create the law. Part V will then argue for a specific exemption
from Section 404 for small businesses similar to Regulation D.
This exemption is both necessary and feasible because the
reasoning and concepts behind other securities law exemptions,
including Regulation D, can apply to a Section 404 exemption
as well.
18

17 C.F.R. § 230.501(e) (2005).
See infra Part V.D.
20
See Sarbanes-Oxley §§ 802(a) (18 U.S.C. §§ 1519-1520 (2005)) and 1106(1)
(15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2005)) for examples of the increased penalties imposed by
Sarbanes-Oxley.
21
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2005) [hereinafter Securities Act].
22
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2005) [hereinafter Exchange Act].
23
See William S. Lerach, Plundering America: How American Investors Got
Taken for Trillions by Corporate Insiders – The Rise of the New Corporate Kleptocracy,
8 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 69, 73 n.9 (2002) (“The current climate is regularly compared
to the 1930s.”).
19
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II.

HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

The Securities and Exchange Commission was created
as a result of two years of hearings by the Senate Banking and
Currency Committee to investigate securities dealings and
banking practices. 24 From 1932 to 1934, these investigations,
often referred to as the Pecora Hearings, 25 examined the stock
exchange practices that were prevalent in the years leading up
to the stock market crash of October, 1929. 26 Among the
revelations uncovered by the Committee was evidence of the
enormous financial losses experienced by investors as a result
of the market crash. In the decade following World War I, for
example, companies in the United States sold $50 billion in
new securities. 27 The stock market crash rendered $25 billion
of them worthless. 28 The market effects were not limited to
new issues, however. On September 1, 1929 – less than two
months before the crash – the aggregate value of all the stocks
listed on the New York Stock Exchange was $89 billion. 29 Two
and a half years later, in 1932, the aggregate figure was down
to $15 billion – a loss of over eighty-three percent. 30
These and other reports of massive financial losses
combined with the crash and the Great Depression to provide

24

See S. REP. NO. 73-1455, at 1 (1934); SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 1.
The hearings are named after Ferdinand Pecora, who played an influential
role in the hearings as the Committee’s counsel. An Italian immigrant born in Sicily,
he eventually became known as the “hellhound of Wall Street.” After a successful
career in the office of New York City’s district attorney in which he was credited with
the successful prosecution of over 150 fraudulent securities salesmen, he was offered
the position of counsel to the Committee in 1933. His political ambitions, however,
were not as successful. He failed to become the Democratic nominee for district
attorney in 1930, and later ran unsuccessfully as the Democratic nominee for mayor of
New York City in 1950. SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 20-21.
26
Lerach, supra note 23, at 75 (“In the wake of the 1929 Crash, Congress’s
Pecorra [sic] hearings exposed the rawest kind of self-dealing, abuse and fraud by
corporate insiders, Wall Street bankers (coining the term ‘banksters’), and the
accounting firms during the 1920s.”).
27
H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 2 (1933).
28
Id.
29
LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES
REGULATION 28 (4th ed. 2001).
30
Id. Adjusted for inflation, the $74 billion decline in aggregate market
value during that time period is equivalent to a decline of over $1 trillion in 2004
dollars. Figures adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price Index; CPI statistics
obtained
from
the
Bureau
of
Labor
Statistics,
available
at
ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt (last visited Aug. 18, 2005).
25
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the political momentum to enact the federal securities laws. 31
In fact, twice during 1933 the Senate authorized its Committee
on Banking and Currency to expand its investigation beyond
the original mandate of stock exchange practices to include
broad areas of banking and business. 32 During the course of
the investigation, prominent members of the financial
community testified before the Committee, including the
president of the New York Stock Exchange 33 and J.P. Morgan,
who at the time was head of the largest private bank in the
In addition, numerous traders and investment
world. 34
bankers from Wall Street’s most prominent firms 35 described
the details of manipulative trading devices such as stock pools 36
and other deceptive practices in commercial and investment
banking. 37
The stated purpose of the investigation was to “lay the
foundation for remedial legislation.” 38 In doing so, the Pecora
Hearings sought to determine the reasons for the “staggering
decreases” in the values of securities and to propose legislation
The
that would prevent another stock market crash. 39
Hearings had another obvious, yet unstated, purpose as well –
to diminish the public’s faith in the nation’s financial
institutions. 40 In order to enact effective securities regulation
31
JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 3
(4th ed. 2004) (“[I]t was the Great Depression and the market collapse in October 1929
that provided the political momentum for congressional action that would over the
course of a decade produce a collection of acts known as the federal securities laws.”).
32
S. REP. NO. 73-1455, supra note 24, at 2-4 (“The subcommittee has
endeavored to investigate thoroughly and impartially some of the complex and
manifold ramifications of the business of issuing, offering, and selling securities and
the business of banking and extending credit. It has endeavored to expose banking
operations and practices deemed detrimental to the public welfare; to reveal unsavory
and unethical methods employed in the floatation and sale of securities; and to disclose
devices whereby income-tax liability is avoided or evaded.”).
33
Id. at 19-29 (excerpted testimony of Richard Whitney).
34
Id. at 84 (excerpted testimony of J.P. Morgan).
35
Id. at 5-154. Investment bankers and traders from firms such as Chase
Securities Corp, Dillon, Read, & Co., and National City Bank testified before the
Committee. See id. at 13, 40, 86. See also SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 24-38.
36
S. REP. NO. 73-1455, supra note 24, at 30-31. A stock pool is an agreement
between several people to actively trade a stock in order to raise its price so that a
profit can be made later by selling their shares at the artificially inflated price to the
unsuspecting public. Id. at 31.
37
Id. at 83-153.
38
Id. at 4.
39
SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 2.
40
Id.; Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1592-93 (2005) (stating that the Pecora
hearings “were orchestrated to develop an explanation of the market crash as having
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on the federal level, the Pecora Hearings sought to “galvanize[]
broad public support for direct federal regulation of the stock
markets.” 41 In its reports on the Pecora Hearings, the Senate
Committee indicted the system as a whole by demonstrating
that the system had failed to impose essential fiduciary
standards on persons whose responsibility it was to handle
other people’s money. 42
Broad public support and political momentum for
sweeping reform resulted in the passage of the Securities Act
in 1933 and the Exchange Act one year later. 43 The Securities
Act focuses on disclosure 44 and requires corporations to disclose
information about their financial conditions and future
prospects in order to inform investors and allow them to make
The Securities Act also requires
educated decisions. 45
registration for securities that are sold to the public in order to
record transactions and facilitate other corporate operations,
such as dividend payments and elections. 46 The Exchange Act
established the SEC, regulates broker-dealers and securities
markets, and imposes disclosure requirements on publicly held
companies and proxy solicitations. 47 More than any other
securities law, it defines the industry’s regulatory system and
governs how securities are traded. 48
Congress gave the SEC the power to create rules and
regulations as the principal securities regulator in the United

been caused by market manipulation, fraud, and abuse by financial firms, in order to
implement an agenda for market regulation.”). It has also been suggested that
Congress exaggerated the “effect and existence” of market abuses in the 1920s for
political purposes – to make the new securities laws seem more necessary. See Paul
Mahoney, The Stock Pools and the Securities Exchange Act, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 343, 367
(1999).
41
SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 2.
42
James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29, 30 (1959).
43
SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 54, 75.
44
Choi & Pritchard, supra note 7, at 5 (noting that disclosure is the
“prevailing regulatory strategy in securities markets”).
45
DAVID P. MCCAFFREY & DAVID W. HART, WALL STREET POLICES ITSELF:
HOW SECURITIES FIRMS MANAGE THE LEGAL HAZARDS OF COMPETITIVE PRESSURES 47
(1998). See also THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (SEC): BACKGROUND,
ISSUES, BIBLIOGRAPHY, at xxv-xxx (Brian J. Wilder ed., 2003) [hereinafter Wilder].
46
MCCAFFREY & HART, supra note 45, at 47.
47
See NORMAN POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW & REGULATION, § 13.01 (2d ed.
2001); MCCAFFREY & HART, supra note 45, at 47; Wilder, supra note 45, at xxvii.
48
MCCAFFREY & HART, supra note 45, at 47. See also Wilder, supra note 45,
at xxv-xxx.
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States, 49 but also placed restrictions on that power. 50 In Section
2 of the Securities Act, Congress dictated that the
Commission’s rules must protect investors and promote
efficiency, competition, and capital formation. 51 In fulfilling
that mandate, the SEC has regularly recognized the
importance of small businesses and carved out special
provisions designed to address the unique problems they face. 52
III.

THE PRECEDENT FOR SMALL BUSINESS EXEMPTIONS

A.

Importance of Small Businesses

Small businesses are the lifeblood of the American
economy 53 and the source of most of the economy’s innovation
and opportunity. 54 According to the U.S. Census, in 2000 there
were approximately 5.6 million small businesses in the United
States. 55 During 2000 and 2001, small businesses with fewer
49
See 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2005) (establishing the Securities and Exchange
Commission). See also James D. Cox, Regulatory Duopoly in U.S. Securities Markets,
99 COLUM. L. REV. 1200, 1205 (1999) (“[T]he Securities and Exchange Commission has
been the supreme regulatory authority in the United States since its creation in
1934.”); Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 319, 320 n.8 (2002)
(“The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has statutory authority to establish
financial accounting and reporting standards for publicly held companies under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.”).
50
15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2005) (describing the rulemaking considerations the
SEC must make).
51
Id.
52
See infra Part III.
53
Susan Ness, Regulating Media Competition: The Development and
Implications of the FCC’s New Broadcast Ownership Rules, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 533, 543
(2004) (“Small business is the lifeblood of this country.”); Mark E. Roszkowski, State
Oil Company v. Kahn and the Rule of Reason: The End of Intrabrand Competition?, 66
ANTITRUST L. J. 613, 634 (1998) (“Interests of entrepreneurs and small business have
been a recurrent concern because independent entrepreneurs have been seen as the
heart and lifeblood of American free enterprise . . . .”); Comm’r Norman S. Johnson,
Small Business: The Lifeblood of Our Nation’s Economy, Remarks at the 18th Annual
Government-Business Forum on Small Business Capital Formation (Sept. 13, 1999), at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1999/spch292.htm (“Small business is
truly the lifeblood of this nation’s economy.”).
54
Verkuil, supra note 13, at 220 (“Many of our most innovative high
technology companies such as those in the microprocessor industry began as small
businesses.”). See also William J. Casey, SEC Rules 144 and 146 Revisited, 43 BROOK.
L. REV. 571, 572 (1977) (“Almost every new technology that has given a lift to the
American economy has come from a new company, struggling in a garage or venturing
out to obtain needed capital from the public.”).
55
U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2003, § 15:
Business Enterprise 493, 506, tbl. 747 (2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/
2004pubs/03statab/business.pdf. The U.S. Small Business Administration Office of
Size Standards defines small business as a business that has between one and five
hundred employees. Office of Advocacy, Small Business Administration, Small
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than five hundred employees also created virtually all of the
net new jobs in the United States. 56 Overall, the small business
sector accounts for more than 50% of the gross domestic
product in the United States. 57
Despite their importance, however, small businesses
face unique challenges in conforming to federal laws because of
The Small Business Administration has
their size. 58
exhaustively documented the unique burdens faced by small
businesses in complying with all types of federal regulations. 59
In response, Congress has passed laws such as the Regulatory
Flexibility Act 60 that recognize the impact that federal
regulation has on small business entities 61 and require
regulatory agencies to consider types of exemptions and
reduced standards for them. 62 Regardless of how “small
business” is defined, 63 the exemptions are all based on the
common belief that a business’s small size justifies exemption

Business By The Numbers (June 2004) (on file with author), at
http://www.sbaonline.sba.gov/advo/stats/sbfaq.pdf [hereinafter Small Business By The
Numbers].
56
Small Business By The Numbers, supra note 55. In those two years, large
business employment decreased by 150,905, while small businesses saw a net increase
of 1,150,875 jobs. Id.
57
Id.
58
See Verkuil, supra note 13, at 221 (stating that the complexity of federal
regulations and economies of scale combine to disadvantage small businesses).
59
See generally The Impact of Regulatory Costs on Small Firms, A Report for
The Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration, available at
http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/rs207tot.pdf (last visited Aug. 18, 2005) (stating that
it costs firms employing fewer than 20 employees $6,975 per employee to comply with
all required federal regulations, nearly 60% more than the cost per employee for firms
with more than 500 employees.).
60
RFA, supra note 13.
61
THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF
REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 115 (1991) (“A primary purpose of
the Regulatory Flexibility Act is to make regulatory agencies sensitive to the impacts of
their regulations on small business entities. This reflects a legislative determination
that small businesses bear a disproportionate share of the regulatory compliance
expenses . . . .”).
62
Verkuil, supra note 13, at 271 (stating that the RFA urges agencies “to
recognize differences in size when promulgating rules”); C. Steven Bradford, Does Size
Matter? An Economic Analysis of Small Business Exemptions from Regulation, 8 J.
SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 1, 3 (2004) [hereinafter Bradford, Size].
63
United States Regulatory Council, TIERING REGULATIONS; A PRACTICAL
GUIDE 4-9 (1981) (stating that while small firms are often characterized as such by the
number of employees they have, “small” is defined in a wide variety of ways for
different laws, including the amount of the firm’s assets and the size of the transaction
being regulated). See e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(iii)(2) (2005) (enacting an exemption
for securities offerings made by non-reporting companies if the amount of the offering
does not exceed $1 million.).
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from some regulations. 64 This belief is not only reflected in
laws passed by Congress – there is broad public support for
reduced regulation of small businesses as well. 65
In light of the Congressional mandate for regulatory
relief for small businesses and in recognition of their
importance to the economy, federal securities laws and
regulations have traditionally contained special provisions for
small businesses as well. 66 In fact, when the Securities Act was
originally enacted, it contained an exemption from registration
for offerings of $100,000 or less. 67 Congress has also added
other exemptions to the Securities Act designed to help small
businesses. 68 One specific concern addressed by these and
other exemptions is the ability of small businesses to grow by
allowing them access to financing and capital. 69 Raising money
in the public capital markets can be problematic for small
companies in part because of the high relative costs of
complying with the federal securities laws. 70 In this context,
the SEC has devoted its Office of Small Business to “the
analysis of the securities laws’ impact upon small-business
capital development.” 71 As a result, the SEC has adopted rules
and regulations, including Regulation D, which provide for

64

Bradford, Size, supra note 62, at 3.
See, e.g., Robert A. Peterson et al., Opinions About Government Regulation
of Small Business, 22 J. SMALL BUS. MGMT. 56, 59 (1984) (citing results of a survey
which found that a majority of the general public surveyed favored less governmental
regulation for small business).
66
Perry E. Wallace, Jr., Integration of Securities Offerings: Obstacles to
Capital Formation Remain for Small Businesses, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 935, 935-36
(1988) (stating that small issuers are particularly deserving of relief from unnecessary
legal strictures because of the significant economic benefits they confer on American
society).
67
Securities Act § 3(b) (codified in Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 3b, 48
Stat. 75 (1933) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §77c (2005))). The threshold for this
exemption is currently $5 million.
68
See, e.g., Securities Act § 4(6) (codified in 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2005))
(exempting transactions of $5 million or less that involve accredited investors).
69
Johnson, supra note 53 (“[T]he Commission and small businesses share an
interest in streamlining the capital formation process.”).
70
C. Steven Bradford, Securities Regulation and Small Business: Rule 504
and the Case for an Unconditional Exemption, 5 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. l, 3-4
(2001) [hereinafter Bradford, Securities] (“[B]ecause of economies of scale in
registration, the cost of registering small offerings is disproportionately burdensome,
consuming a greater percentage of the offering price than in larger offerings.”).
71
Stuart R. Cohn, The Impact of Securities Laws on Developing Companies:
Would the Wright Brothers Have Gotten off the Ground?, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS.
L. 315, 317 (1999). See also Verkuil, supra note 13, at 226 n.73 (stating that the SEC’s
Office of Small Business seeks to minimize the negative impact of the Commission’s
rules on small business).
65
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certain exemptions to the registration requirements for
transactions done by small businesses. 72
B.

Regulation D

Almost 50 years after the Securities Act was passed, 73
the SEC adopted Regulation D in response to concerns about
small businesses’ access to the capital markets. 74 For years
before Regulation D was enacted, many commentators
criticized the regulations and requirements of the federal
securities laws because of the comparatively disproportionate
costs they imposed on small businesses that attempted to raise
capital in the public securities markets. 75 In response, the SEC
held a series of public hearings to examine the special problems
faced by small issuers under the federal securities laws, 76
especially the effects of regulations on small businesses’ access

72

Cohn, supra note 71, at 317 n.2 (listing several recent rule changes,
including reforms to Regulation D of the Securities Act of 1933).
73
Regulation D replaced three earlier exemptive rules. Release No. 33-6389,
supra note 16 (“Regulation D replaces exemptions that currently exist under Rules 146,
240, and 242.”).
74
Id. (“Regulation D is the product of the Commission’s evaluation of the
impact of its rules and regulations on the ability of small businesses to raise capital.
This study has revealed a particular concern that the registration requirements and
the exemptive scheme of the Securities Act impose disproportionate restraints on small
issuers.”). See also Tom A. Alberg & Martin E. Lybecker, New SEC Rules 146 and 147:
The Nonpublic and Intrastate Offering Exemptions from Registration for the Sale of
Securities, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 622, 622 (1974) (stating that most small businesses are
precluded from raising capital by selling securities to the public due to the high cost of
SEC registration); Roy L. Brooks, Small Business Financing Alternatives Under the
Securities Act of 1933, 13 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 543, 546 (1980) (stating that the
regulatory burden on small business issuers is a significant factor in the high cost of
obtaining capital).
75
Securities Act Release No. 33-5914, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 81,530 (Mar. 6, 1978) [hereinafter Release No. 33-5914] (acknowledging
that calls for action had come from a variety of sources, including “the Small Business
Administration, venture capital groups, and a substantial number of professional
commentators.”). See Brooks, supra note 74, at 545-46 (stating that small business
growth had been stagnant due to the “high cost of long term equity capital”); Lawrence
A. Coles, Jr., Has Securities Law Regulation in the Private Capital Markets Become a
Deterrent to Capital Growth: A Critical Review, 58 MARQ. L. REV. 395, 462-63 (1975)
(arguing that the exemptive scheme was “less useful than intended”).
76
Release No. 33-6389, supra note 16; Release No. 33-5914, supra note 75
(stating that the SEC began its evaluation in 1978 with 21 days of hearings in six
different cities). See also Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr., The Plight of Small Issuers (And
Others) Under Regulation D: Those Nagging Problems That Need Attention, 74 KY. L.J.
127, 130 (1985) (“[T]he Commission . . . realized that it needed to take a hard look at
the special problems of small issuers under the federal securities laws.”).
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to capital. 77 As will be discussed in Part III.C of this note, the
economic rationale for Regulation D – like all small offering
exemptions – was the high relative cost to small businesses of
registering securities. 78
Regulation D consists of eight rules enacted by the SEC
which provide exemptions from the registration requirements
for offerings made under the Securities Act of 1933. 79
According to the SEC, Regulation D was designed to
accomplish three goals: 1) to simplify and clarify the existing
exemption scheme; 2) to eliminate unnecessary restrictions on
issuers, and small businesses in particular; and 3) to achieve
uniformity between state and federal exemptions “in order to
facilitate capital formation consistent with the protection of
investors.” 80 Regulation D sets out three separate exemptions
in Rules 504, 81 505, 82 and 506. 83 Rule 504 provides an offering
exemption from registration for transactions totaling less than
$1 million, 84 provided the issuer meets certain other specified
conditions. 85 Rule 505 provides an exemption for offerings up

77
Release No. 33-6389, supra note 16 (“Regulation D is the product of the
Commission’s evaluation of the impact of its rules and regulations on the ability of
small businesses to raise capital.”); Release No. 33-5914, supra note 75.
78
Bradford, Securities, supra note 70, at 4. Many of the substantial fixed
costs directly associated with registering an offering, which can range from $200,000 to
$500,000, do not vary with the size of the offering. C. Steven Bradford, Transaction
Exemptions in the Securities Act of 1933: An Economic Analysis, 45 EMORY L.J. 591,
603-14 (1996) [hereinafter Bradford, Exemptions] (stating that “for small offerings, the
cost of registration is proportionately too great compared to the benefit”). See also
notes 102-38 infra and accompanying text.
79
Congress had provided the SEC with specific exemptive authority in §§
3(b), 4(2), and 4(6) of the Securities Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 77 c(b) (2005); 15 U.S.C. §
77d(2) (2005); 15 U.S.C. § 77d(6) (2005). See also Campbell, supra note 76, at 127
(“Regulation D traces its roots to section 4(2) and section 3(b) of the Securities Act of
1933 . . . .”).
80
Release No. 33-6389, supra note 16. See also Mark F. Donahue, Regulation
D: A Primer for the Practitioner, 8 DEL. J. CORP. L. 495, 496 (1983) (“Regulation D is
the latest in a series of legislative and administrative efforts to limit the burden
otherwise imposed by the 1933 Act on small businesses seeking to raise capital.”).
81
17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2005).
82
17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (2005).
83
17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2005).
84
17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(2) (2005). When Regulation D was adopted in 1982,
the limit was $500,000. The dollar amount was raised to $1 million in 1988. See
Securities Act Release No. 33-6758, [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 84,221 (Mar. 3, 1988) [hereinafter Release No. 33-6758].
85
17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b) (2005). In an offering made under Rule 504, general
solicitation is permitted in limited circumstances.
MARC I. STEINBERG,
UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW 49 (3d ed. 2001). In addition, the aggregate amount
of securities offered under Rule 504 cannot exceed $1 million for any 12 month period.
Id.
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to $5 million, 86 but imposes more restrictions on the
Most
characteristics of the offering than Rule 504. 87
importantly, offerings made under Rule 505 are limited in the
types and numbers of investors who may participate 88 and, as a
result, issuers are required to account for the number and
nature of the purchasers of these securities. 89 Rule 506 differs
from the other two rules in that it does not set a limit on the
size of the transaction. 90 It instead focuses on the number and
nature of the investors who participate in the offering 91 to an
even greater extent than does Rule 505. 92
Together, these three rules provide a comprehensive set
of exemptions 93 that, while technically available to companies
of all sizes, were specifically designed to benefit small
companies attempting to obtain financing through a public
securities offering. 94 According to the SEC, this design has
been effective in practice as well as in theory. In a recent
release, the Commission estimated that small businesses
continue to be the principal beneficiaries of Regulation D. 95 In

86

17 C.F.R. § 230.505(b)(2)(i) (2005).
17 C.F.R. § 230.505(b)(2)(ii) (2005).
88
This restriction is based on the distinction between accredited and
unaccredited investors. Accredited investors typically have more wealth at their
disposal and are irrebuttably presumed to be sophisticated investors. As a result, they
do not require registration-type disclosure from companies making exempt offerings.
STEINBERG, supra note 85, at 41. Rule 501(a) lists eight types of accredited investors,
among them any individual with a net worth of more than $1 million and any
individual with an annual income of more than $200,000 (or, if married, a combined
annual income of more than $300,000). While an offering made under Rule 505 cannot
be purchased by more than thirty-five unaccredited investors, an unlimited number of
accredited investors may participate. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2005).
89
Sargent, supra note 17, at 233 (stating that the amount and type of
purchasers dictates the type of disclosure that is required).
90
Compare 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2005) (codifying § 4(2) of the Securities Act,
which grants authority for exemptions (such as Rule 506) that are not limited by the
size of the transaction), with 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (2005) (codifying § 3(b) of the Securities
Act, which grants authority for exemptions (including Rules 504 and 505) that are
restricted to offerings where the aggregate amount does not exceed $5 million).
91
17 C.F.R. §§ 230.506(b)(2)(i)-(ii) (2005).
92
Sargent, supra note 17, at 235. Like Rule 505, Rule 506 allows for a
maximum of 35 unaccredited investors to participate in an offering. In addition, Rule
506 also requires that all unaccredited investors meet certain “sophistication
standards.” Release No. 33-6389, supra note 16.
93
Sargent, supra note 17, at 236.
94
Donahue, supra note 80, at 496 (“[T]he new rules were primarily adopted
to facilitate capital growth by small businesses . . . .”).
95
Securities Act Release No. 33-7644, [1999 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,114, at 86,114 (Feb. 25, 1999) (“While it is not possible to know with
certainty, it is believed that most of these [Regulation D] offerings were done by small
businesses.”).
87
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addition, the SEC has reported on the increasing popularity of
the exemptions, with over 17,000 Form Ds – the required
notice of the sale of unregistered securities under Regulation D
– filed in fiscal year 2003. 96
While Regulation D provides relief from the registration
requirement, it does not allow for complete exemption from the
federal securities laws. For example, as with all securities
offerings, those made under Regulation D are subject to all the
antifraud provisions of the Securities and Exchange Acts. 97
Furthermore, there are additional restrictions imposed on
offerings made under Regulation D that do not exist in
registered offerings which are designed to protect investors. 98
For example, Regulation D imposes a ban on general
solicitation and advertising for offerings made under Rule 505
or 506. 99 Regulation D also sets restrictions on the number and
type of investors who may purchase securities in an exempt
offering. 100 As a result, the limited and specifically targeted
exemptions of Regulation D provide their intended relief
without undermining the purpose and objectives of the federal
securities regulations. 101 A similar exemptive scheme will be
advocated in Part V.D of this note as an exemption to
Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404.
C.

Small Businesses and the Need for Regulatory
Exemptions

Proponents of small business exemptions from
regulation rely on the basic economic tenet that the benefit of a

96
See Release No. 33-6389, supra note 16; Small Business Regulation D
Exemption Process (Mar. 29, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/about/oig/audit/371fin.pdf.
97
These provisions include Section 17(a) of the Securities Act (15 U.S.C. §
77q (2005)) and Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C § 78j (2005)).
98
Bradford, Securities, supra note 70, at 31 (“The choice is not simply
between full registration or nothing at all.”).
99
17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (2005).
100
17 C.F.R. § 230.501(e) (2005).
101
Sargent, supra note 17, at 292 (“Regulation D substantially reduces the
costs of compliance for small business issuers without substantially increasing
investors’ risk of fraud or overreaching.”). Congress gave the SEC an explicit mandate
in Section 2 of the Securities Act, stating that when the Commission creates a rule
pursuant to the Act, it must consider whether the rule protects investors and the public
interest, as well as promotes efficiency, competition, and capital formation. 15 U.S.C. §
77b (2005). The SEC further acknowledged the need to strike this balance in its final
release describing Regulation D, stating that the rules were designed “to facilitate
capital formation consistent with the protection of investors.” Release No. 33-6389,
supra note 16.

444

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:1

regulation must outweigh its cost. 102 In fact, one commentator
has said that any government regulation whose costs exceed its
benefits is “senseless.” 103 In the case of small businesses, the
relative costs of compliance with federal regulations can be
disproportionately high, both in terms of dollars and
manpower. 104 This is the result of economies of scale, the idea
that the average costs per dollar of proceeds decrease as the
size of the company or transaction increases because fixed costs
can be spread out. 105 As a result, only larger companies and
larger transactions benefit from lower average costs. 106
Economies of scale are particularly prominent in
securities regulations. 107 For example, paperwork and record
keeping requirements, such as the number of reports and the
time required to complete them, often do not vary with the size
of the business. 108 In addition, the costs of interpreting a
regulation are often extensive. 109 In many small businesses,
the owners or managers perform several different tasks in
managing and operating the business. 110 Since the personnel in
many small businesses are not specialized, 111 it often falls to
102
Bradford, Securities, supra note 70, at 5 (“[R]egulation is not justified if the
cost of the regulation exceeds the benefits it produces.”).
103
Id. at 23 (“[G]overnment regulation is senseless if the cost of the regulation
exceeds the benefit. We should not pay a million dollars to prevent a thousand dollar
loss.”).
104
See Bradford, Size, supra note 62, at 7-11; Overregulation of Small
Business: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Gov’t Reg. of the S. Select Comm. on Small
Bus., 94th Cong. 30 (1976) [hereinafter Hearing on Overregulation of Small Business]
(statement of Donald S. Shoup, President, Winnipesaukee Aviation) (“In a small
business it is often the owner-manager who must do it [compile and submit the
required reports], at the expense of devoting his time and energies to making the
business go.”).
105
Bradford, Exemptions, supra note 78, at 614 (“Due to these economies of
scale, the total cost of registration increases as the dollar amount of the offering
increases, but at a rate less than the rate of increase of the dollar amount.”).
106
Bradford, Size, supra note 62, at 14.
107
“There are scale economies in regulatory compliance if the average cost of
complying with regulation – measured by the total cost of complying with regulations
divided by firm size . . . decreases with firm size.” WILLIAM A. BROCK & DAVID S.
EVANS, THE ECONOMICS OF SMALL BUSINESSES: THEIR ROLE AND REGULATION IN THE
U.S. ECONOMY 65 (1986).
108
Bradford, Size, supra note 62, at 9 (“[T]he cost to compile the necessary
information and prepare the required reports . . . is fixed.”).
109
Id. at 8-9 (stating that small businesses are at a disadvantage in
monitoring and interpreting complex federal laws and regulations because the costs of
doing so can be substantial).
110
See Hearing on Overregulation of Small Business, supra note 104, at 30
(statement of Donald S. Shoup, President, Winnipesaukee Aviation).
111
See Federal Paperwork Requirements: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Gov’t Reg. and Paperwork of the S. Select Comm. on Small Bus., 96th Cong. 12 (1979)
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the owner or manager of the business to ensure compliance
with federal regulations, which takes time and energy away
Further, complex
from running the business itself. 112
regulations that require expert interpretation, such as
Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404, must be outsourced to expensive
professionals such as lawyers and accountants. 113 On the other
hand, large businesses have staff specifically dedicated to
regulatory compliance, which allows management to devote its
time and efforts to running the business. 114
In a securities offering, for example, the substantial cost
of registering the offering with the SEC consumes a larger
percentage of the offering proceeds in a smaller offering than in
a larger offering. 115 The costs of registration, which by one
estimate can range from $200,000 to $500,000, 116 include fees
for legal and accounting work, filing fees paid to the SEC, and
printing costs. 117 In addition, this amount does not include the
fee paid to the underwriters, which is taken out of the offering
price in the form of a discount. 118 Companies can use several
types of forms to register offerings, depending on their size and
characteristics. 119 Form S-3 is used to register public securities
offerings from most large, established companies. 120 Forms SB-

(statement of Wayne G. Granquist, Associate Director, Management and Regulatory
Policy, Office of Management and Budget) (stating that government requirements for
information are exceptionally difficult for small businesses because their employees are
not specialized).
112
See Hearing on Overregulation of Small Business, supra note 104, at 30.
113
See Thomas Watterson, Accountants Riding the Sarbanes-Oxley Wave,
BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 10, 2004, at G7 (stating that companies and external auditors
need accountants with at least three to five years experience to handle the relatively
challenging work related to Sarbanes-Oxley); Bradford, Size, supra note 62, at 8
(“Federal laws and regulations are often complex – as one congressional witness
complained, ‘written . . . by lawyers for lawyers.’”).
114
Hearing on Overregulation of Small Business, supra note 104, at 30
(statement of Donald S. Shoup, President, Winnipesaukee Aviation) (“In a large
business the compiling and submission of required reports is the specific job of certain
individuals.”).
115
Bradford, Securities, supra note 70, at 24.
116
Bradford, Exemptions, supra note 78, at 603.
117
Bradford, Securities, supra note 70, at 24.
118
Id. at 24-25. The fee received by the underwriter is the difference between
the public offering price and the proceeds received by the issuer company. In a
hypothetical offering where the offering price is $10 per share, the underwriter would
sell shares to the public at $10 share, but only pay the issuer company $9.50 per share,
keeping the $0.50 per share difference as a fee.
119
STEINBERG, supra note 85, at 114-15.
120
Id. at 114. Form S-3 is available to companies which have been subject to
the reporting requirements of the Exchange Act for 12 months and have a market
value of $75 million or more. Form S-3 requires the least disclosure to be presented in
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1 and SB-2 are special registration forms provided by the SEC
for small business issuers. 121 Small business issuers can use
Form SB-1 to register up to $10 million of securities, 122 while
Form SB-2 can be used by small business issuers to sell any
amount of securities. 123 Finally, Form S-1 is used primarily by
first-time issuers for initial public offerings. 124
The cost and preparation time required for each of these
types of forms varies greatly. In a 1998 Securities Act Release,
the SEC made its own estimate of the hours of work required
by a company’s internal staff and external professionals to
prepare a registration statement for a public offering. 125 It
found that only 398 hours were required to prepare Form S-3. 126
In contrast, the special registration forms provided by the SEC
for small or newly public companies required much more time
to prepare. According to the SEC’s estimates, 710 hours were
required for Form SB-1 and 876 hours were required to prepare
Form SB-2. 127 The most preparation time was required to
complete Form S-1, consuming 1,267 hours of internal and
external staff time. 128
the prospectus because it allows companies to incorporate information that has already
been disclosed in previous SEC filings. Id. at 114-15.
121
A small business issuer is a U.S. or Canadian issuer that 1) has annual
revenues of less than $25 million, 2) an aggregate market value of less than $25
million, and 3) is not an investment company. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2005). See also
STEINBERG, supra note 85, at 115. Forms SB-1 and SB-2 are part of the framework of
Regulation SB, which was adopted by the SEC in 1992 to facilitate small businesses’
access to the capital markets. Id.
122
Regulation of Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 33-7606A,
Exchange Act Release No. 40632A, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-23519A,
[1999 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,108, at 81,461-63 (Nov. 13, 1998)
[hereinafter Release No. 33-7606A]. Form SB-1 is used only if no more than $10
million in securities, including the present offering, have been registered in any 12month period. STEINBERG, supra note 85, at 430.
123
Release No. 33-7606A, supra note 122, ¶ 81,584; STEINBERG, supra note 85,
at 430.
124
STEINBERG, supra note 85, at 429. Form S-1 is the basic, long-form
registration statement and requires full registrant and transaction information to be
included in the prospectus. Id.
125
Release No. 33-7606A, supra note 122, ¶¶ 81,461-63 (proposing rules
changes to allow more companies to use the small business forms, thereby reducing the
costs of registered offerings for small issuers). The SEC estimated that 75% of the time
required to prepare the forms would be used by external professionals, as opposed to
internal corporate staff. Id. ¶¶ 81,584-85.
126
Id. ¶¶ 81,584-85.
127
Id.
128
Id. ¶ 81,584 (detailing the regulation of securities offerings). The forms
used by less seasoned issuers require more disclosure than those used by larger, more
established companies. Form S-3, for example, allows companies to incorporate much
of the required information by reference to other disclosure documents filed with the
SEC, such as quarterly and annual reports. Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System,
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Further, in a separate study the SEC’s Advisory
Committee on Capital Formation and Regulatory Processes
found that the costs per dollar raised were highest in offerings
made by companies using Form SB-2 for small business
issuers. 129 On a percentage basis, though, the costs were lowest
for companies using Form S-3. 130 The Committee concluded
that the costs of a registered public offering for small
companies and new entrants to the capital markets equal a
larger percentage of offering proceeds than for larger and more
seasoned issuers. 131 Due to economies of scale, therefore,
regulations that impose high fixed costs can be a substantial
impediment to the growth and flexibility of small businesses. 132
Economies of scale do not only apply to the costs of
securities transactions, however. The SEC has also recognized
that they exist in regulatory and compliance costs as well. 133
During the course of its investigation leading up to the
adoption of Regulation D, the SEC acknowledged that “the cost
of compliance with Exchange Act reporting requirements is not
only substantial in absolute amounts but is relatively greater
for smaller companies than for larger issuers.” 134 In adopting
Regulation D, the SEC intended it to substantially reduce costs
to small business issuers of securities. 135 Additionally, there is
significant anecdotal evidence, much of it collected by the SEC
itself, regarding the extent of the negative effect of

Securities Act Release No. 33-6383, [1937-1982 Accounting Series Releases Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 72,328 (Mar. 3, 1982) [hereinafter Release No. 336383] (adopting the basic framework for registration statements); Securities Act
Release No. 33-6964, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 83,385, at
83,385-86 (Oct. 22, 1992) [hereinafter Release No. 33-6964] (revising the rules for using
the Form S-3 short-form registration statement).
129
Securities and Exchange Commission, Report of the Advisory Committee
on Capital Formation and Regulatory Processes, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) Special
Report No. 1725 app. at 5, tbl. 1 (July 24, 1996), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/capform.htm.
130
Id.
131
Id. app. A, at 2.
132
Verkuil, supra note 13, at 221 (“Laws and regulations, intended for both
large and small firms, are having an increasingly negative effect on the growth of small
business. This negative effect occurs in two ways: because small businesses have fewer
units of output over which to spread regulatory costs, regulatory costs are higher per
unit of output; and small businesses lack requisite size to take advantage of economies
of scale in regulatory-compliance, personnel, and data systems.”).
133
Exchange Act Release No. 34-16866, [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 82,606, at 83,227 (June 2, 1980).
134
Id.
135
Sargent, supra note 17, at 239 (describing the SEC’s intent that “the
substantive provisions of the Regulation” would “relieve issuers of substantial costs”).
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overregulation of small businesses. 136 In recognizing these
small business concerns, the SEC has carved out numerous
exceptions to its rules and requirements in addition to
Regulation D, including exemptions based on the size of the
company 137 and those based on the size of the transaction. 138 As
will be discussed in Part V of this note, the company size
threshold used by other SEC exemptions serves as an
appropriate model for an exemption to Sarbanes-Oxley Section
404 that would alleviate the comparatively disproportionate
impact which it has on small businesses.
IV.

HISTORY OF SARBANES-OXLEY

A.

Background

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act instituted the most
comprehensive changes to the federal securities laws since they
were enacted in the 1930s. 139 The Act strengthened and
modernized the laws 140 in response to the financial and
accounting scandals of the early twenty-first century, including
the financial collapses and bankruptcies of major companies
such as Enron and WorldCom, 141 and sought to “enhance the

136
Cohn, supra note 71, at 365, 366 n.6 (stating that a common theme
revolves around the difficulties faced by small businesses as the result of
overregulation and excessive technicalities).
137
See Exchange Act Rule 12b-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2005) (defining “small
business issuer” as a U.S. or Canadian issuer with less than $25 million in revenues
and public float that is not an investment company); Securities Act Release 33-8128,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-46464, [2002 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶
86,724 (Sept. 5, 2002) [hereinafter Release No. 33-8128] (describing the small company
exemption from the accelerated periodic reporting dates).
138
See Regulation D, supra note 16.
139
Bush, supra note 3, at 1284 (stating that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
represents “the most far-reaching reforms of American business practices since the
time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt”); Manz, supra note 3, at v (describing SarbanesOxley as “the most far-reaching reform of American business practices since the Great
Depression”).
140
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act “seeks, in essence, to revitalize the spirit of the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.” Thomas O.
Gorman & Heather J. Stewart, Is There a New Sheriff in Corporateville? The
Obligations of Directors, Officers, Accountants, and Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley of
2002, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 135, 138 (2004).
141
COX, supra note 31, at 9-10; HAMILTON & RASMUSSEN, supra note 15, at 11
(“Market events evidenced a need to provide investors with a clearer understanding of
the processes that surround the preparation and presentation of financial
information.”).
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quality of reporting and increase investor confidence in the
financial markets.” 142
Enron’s free-fall from grace began with its quarterly
earnings announcement in mid-October 2001, in which the
company disclosed a large decrease in shareholder equity. 143 In
the less than two months that followed, a torrent of bad news,
including an earnings restatement, 144 cash shortages, credit
downgrades, an SEC investigation and an aborted merger, 145
drove the seventh largest corporation in the United States to
file for bankruptcy in December 2001. 146
In late 2001 and early 2002, Congress held numerous
hearings on the collapse of Enron, which at the time was the
largest bankruptcy in U.S. history. 147 Various committees in
both the Senate and the House of Representatives examined
the impact of the Enron scandal on the financial 148 and energy
markets, 149 accounting practices, 150 and retirement accounts and
pension plans. 151 The House Committee on Financial Services

142
143

HAMILTON & RASMUSSEN, supra note 15, at 11.
Floyd Norris, Where Did the Value Go at Enron?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23,

2001, at C1.
144
Floyd Norris, Does Enron Trust Its New Numbers? It Doesn’t Act Like It,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2001, at C1.
145
Oppel & Atlas, supra note 9.
146
See William W. Bratton, Does Corporate Law Protect the Interests of
Shareholders and Other Stakeholders?: Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value,
76 TUL. L. REV. 1275, 1276 (2002) (stating that before Enron filed for bankruptcy
protection on December 2, 2001, it had been the seventh largest American firm by
market capitalization); Oppel & Atlas, supra note 9. For a description of the complex
financial maneuvers used by Enron to disguise its true financial condition, see Smith &
Emshwiller, supra note 9.
147
Bankruptcies are measured by pre-bankruptcy total assets. Enron’s prebankruptcy total assets of $63.4 billion currently ranks it the second-largest
bankruptcy in U.S. history. Enron’s bankruptcy was eclipsed by WorldCom’s $103.9
billion bankruptcy, which was filed on July, 21 2002. Figures from New Generation
Research, Inc., at http://www.bankruptcydata.com/Research/15_Largest.htm (last
visited Aug. 29, 2005).
148
See, e.g., The Enron Collapse: Impact on Investors and Financial Markets:
Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and other
Government Sponsored Enterprises and the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations
of the House Comm. on Financial Services, 107th Cong. (2001).
149
See, e.g., The Effect of the Bankruptcy of Enron on the Functioning of
Energy Markets: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Air Quality of the House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. (2002).
150
See, e.g., Destruction of Enron-related Documents by Andersen Personnel:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. (2002).
151
See, e.g., Protecting the Pensions of Working Americans: Lessons from the
Enron Debacle: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Health, Education, Labor, and
Pensions, 107th Cong. (2002); The Enron Collapse and Its Implications for Worker
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introduced the bill that would become Sarbanes-Oxley on
February 14, 2002, 152 less than five months after the first hint
of trouble at Enron. The Committee approved it after less than
two months of hearings. 153 Some of those who testified at the
hearings, including the presidents of the Securities Industry
Association and the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, cautioned against legislative overreaction to the
Enron scandal that could have unintended negative side
Outside of the hearings, other policymakers,
effects. 154
including Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan,
also recommended legislative restraint for similar reasons. 155
At the time, neither the extent of the financial malfeasance nor
the number of companies that would reveal these types of
The pitfalls of this
accounting problems was known. 156
expedited process were apparent even to the members of the
committee, some of whom openly worried that the negative

Retirement Security: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Education and the
Workforce, 107th Congress (2002).
152
See Manz, supra note 3, at ix.
153
Id.
154
See H.R. 3763 – The Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility
and Transparency Act of 2002: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Financial
Services, 107th Cong. 8-9 (2002) [hereinafter H.R. 3763 Hearings] (statement of Marc
E. Lackritz, President, Securities Industry Association) (advocating a “measured
response” to the Enron scandal and favoring SEC action over congressional legislation);
id. at 14 (statement of James K. Glassman, Resident Fellow, American Enterprise
Institute) (“[I]n times of scandal, emotions run high. And the urge to rush in with
legislative remedies is understandable, but it should be resisted. Parts of H.R. 3763
[CARTA – Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility and Transparency
Act of 2002] are admirable, but market discipline and current criminal and civil laws
provide powerful remedies and protections against another Enron already.”); id. at 17
(statement of Barry C. Melancon, President and CEO, American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants) (“[O]ur economy would be better served [by a] more restrained
approach because the unintended consequences could be extraordinarily negative.”).
155
“We [should not] look to a significant expansion of regulation as the
solution to current problems . . . . Regulation has, over the years, proven only partially
successful in dissuading individuals from playing with the rules of accounting.” Alan
Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Remarks at the Stern School of Business,
New
York
University
(Mar.
26,
2002),
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2002/200203262/default.htm.
156
WorldCom first restated its earnings on June 25, 2002, almost two months
after the first version of the bill had been passed by the House of Representatives and
exactly one month before the final version of Sarbanes-Oxley was passed by both
houses of Congress. See Richard W. Stevenson, Fed Leaves Interest Rates Unchanged,
N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2002, at C11. WorldCom did not file for bankruptcy until July 21,
2002, only nine days before President Bush signed the bill into law. Jonathan D.
Glater, Worldcom Selects 2 For Reorganization Posts, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2002, at
C12.
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consequences of adopting a hasty response could far outweigh
any potential benefits. 157
Current events, however, pressured Congress to act
quickly and decisively. New revelations following just a few
months after Enron’s bankruptcy about accounting abuses at
WorldCom and elsewhere fueled public support for prompt
action. 158 In an election year, no one wanted to appear soft on
the issue of corporate fraud. 159 As a result, the bill passed by a
nearly unanimous vote in both the House of Representatives 160
and the Senate 161 only seven months after Enron declared
bankruptcy. 162 In the same month it was introduced in both
chambers of Congress, 163 President Bush signed SarbanesOxley into law, 164 declaring that “[t]he era of low standards and
false profits is over. No boardroom in America is above or
beyond the law . . . . No more easy money for corporate
criminals, just hard time.” 165
Sarbanes-Oxley is a wide-ranging law that contains
numerous provisions setting out, for example, the
157
H.R. 3763 Hearings, supra note 154, at 30 (statement by Rep. Paul E.
Kanjorski, Member, House Comm. on Financial Services) (“[W]e run the risk of passing
legislation very quickly, and then getting the unintended response. I understand we
are hell-bent on getting this legislation passed by Memorial Day, which is shocking to
me, because I do not think we know the extent of the problem here.”). Time would
prove Rep. Kanjorski correct. Two of the 10 largest bankruptcies in history were filed
after Sarbanes-Oxley was passed. Bankruptcy statistics from New Generation
Research, Inc., http://www.bankruptcydata.com/Research/15_Largest.htm (last visited
Aug. 29, 2005).
158
See Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate
Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 46 (2002)
(“[P]ublic perceptions contribute to this political environment. Revelations of corporate
fraud coincided with public anxiety over the economy and populist sentiments
condemning the insiders who took great wealth out of now-fallen companies.”); Alex
Novarese et al., Under the Long Shadow of Enron, LEGAL WK., Dec. 12, 2002 (reporting
that the news of WorldCom’s accounting irregularities in July 2002 weakened
Sarbanes-Oxley’s opponents in Congress).
159
See Ben Worthen, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Compliance (It
Got Easier), CIO MAG., Dec. 1, 2003 (“Congress responds to public outrage by passing
legislation.”). See also David S. Hilzenrath et al., How Congress Rode a ‘Storm’ to
Corporate Reform, WASH. POST, July 28, 2002, at A1. In the House-Senate conference
committee, Senator Phil Gramm was the only dissenting voice, stating that “[i]n the
environment we’re in, virtually anything could have passed the Congress.” Id.
160
The House passed the bill by a vote of 423-3. 148 CONG. REC. H5480 (daily
ed. July 25, 2002).
161
On July 25, 2002, the Senate voted 99-0 in favor of the bill. 148 CONG.
REC. S7365 (daily ed. July 25, 2002).
162
John Paul Lucci, Enron – The Bankruptcy Heard Around the World and the
International Ricochet of Sarbanes-Oxley, 67 ALB. L. REV. 211, 215 (2003).
163
Id.
164
Bush, supra note 3, at 1285.
165
Id. at 1284-85.
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responsibilities and obligations of a company’s audit
committee 166 and its management, 167 as well as the structure of
the audit committee. 168 Sarbanes-Oxley also established the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”), 169
which along with the SEC, has prescribed rules for complying
with Sarbanes-Oxley. 170 These other provisions, however, are
beyond the scope of this note. The focus of this note is Section
404 and how in its haste to adopt Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress
ignored its potentially disproportionate impact on small
businesses. 171 The small business exemption proposed in this
note addresses some of the unintended, yet serious
consequences of Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 for small
businesses.

166
Sarbanes-Oxley § 301 (codified in 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2005)). An audit
committee is “a committee (or equivalent body) established by and amongst the board
of directors of an issuer for the purpose of overseeing the accounting and financial
reporting processes of the issuer and audits of the financial statements of the issuer.”
Sarbanes-Oxley § 2(a)(3)(A) (codified in 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2005)).
167
Sarbanes-Oxley § 302 (codified in 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2005)).
168
Sarbanes-Oxley § 407 (codified in 15 U.S.C. § 7265 (2005)). See also
Charles Hecht, The Audit Committee Financial Expert (July 2003),
http://accounting.smartpros.com/x38835.xml (explaining that although section 407 is
framed as a disclosure rule, it is a de facto requirement for most boards of directors to
have a financial expert on their audit committees).
169
Sarbanes-Oxley § 101 (codified in 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (2005)).
170
See, e.g., Exchange Act Release No. 34-49544, [2004 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 87,203 (Apr. 8, 2004) [hereinafter Exchange Act Release No. 3449544] (describing PCAOB’s adoption of Accounting Standard No. 2 to govern auditors’
attestations and reports under Section 404).
171
See infra Part IV.D.
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Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 172

Of the many provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley, 173 Section
404 has proven to be one of the most complicated and expensive
for companies to implement. 174 This relatively short section175 is
one of the most significant new obligations for companies under
Sarbanes-Oxley, 176 and as will be shown, one of the most
problematic as well. 177
Specifically, Section 404 requires a company’s annual
178
report to include an assessment by the management of the
effectiveness of the company’s internal control structure and

172

Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404:
Management Assessment of Internal
Controls:
(a) Rules Required: The Commission shall prescribe rules requiring each
annual report required by section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78m or § 78o(d)) to contain an internal control report,
which shall:
(1) state the responsibility of management for establishing and
maintaining an adequate internal control structure and procedures
for financial reporting; and
(2) contain an assessment, as of the end of the most recent fiscal
year of the issuer, of the effectiveness of the internal control
structure and procedures of the issuer for financial reporting.
(b) Internal Control and Evaluation: With respect to the internal control
assessment required by subsection (a), each registered public accounting firm
that prepares or issues the audit report for the issuer shall attest to, and
report on, the assessment made by the management of the issuer. An
attestation made under this subsection shall be made in accordance with
standards for attestation engagements issued or adopted by the Board. Any
such attestation shall not be the subject of a separate engagement.
173
See supra notes 166-70 and accompanying text.
174
See, e.g., Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Mark A. Sides, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
and Fiduciary Duties, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1149, 1184 (2004) (“Section 404’s
requirements, particularly the auditor certification requirement, have been and will
continue to be very challenging for public companies.”); Andrew Parker, SEC To
Consider Rules for Small Companies, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Dec. 17, 2004, at 27 (“The
most expensive provision is Section 404 of the legislation and its stipulation that
companies document and test their internal controls against fraud.”).
175
Andrew Countryman, Law’s Effects Pile Up on Firms; Sarbanes-Oxley’s
Internal-Controls Rules Prove Costly, CHI. TRIB., July 20, 2003, at C1 (“[Section 404 is]
a mere 181 words, compared with more than 2,200 on insider trades during blackout
periods.”).
176
Testimony Concerning Implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002:
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (Sept. 9,
2003), available at http://www.senate.gov/~banking/_files/donaldsn.pdf (statement of
William H. Donaldson, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission) (“For
many companies, the new rules on internal control reports will represent the most
significant single requirement associated with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.”).
177
See infra Part IV.C.
178
As required by section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. §
78m(a)(2) or § 78o(d) (2005)).
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procedures. 179 Section 404 also requires the company’s auditor
to report on and attest to the management’s assessment of the
company’s internal controls. 180 The goal of these two required
reports is to provide investors with information to better
evaluate the management and financial health of the
company 181 and the SEC has adopted rules in order to achieve
this purpose. 182
Internal control is a broad concept that goes beyond the
accounting operations of a company and includes procedures
and processes in every part of a business. 183 Therefore, a
company’s report on its internal controls will not only contain
an appraisal of its financial condition, but will include an
evaluation of things such as the company’s risk assessment
policies and its information and communications systems. 184 In
addition, both of the Section 404 reports are very detailed and
labor-intensive to prepare. For example, preparation of the
report by management on internal controls alone will likely
require contributions from multiple parties, including senior
management, internal auditors, in-house counsel, outside
counsel and audit committee members from the board of
directors. 185 These contributions are needed for management to
179
Section 404(a)(2), supra note 15 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2005)). See
also Securities Act Release No. 33-8238, Exchange Act Release No. 34-47986,
Investment Company Act Release No. IC-26068, [2003 Transfer Binder] Federal Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,023 (June 5, 2003) [hereinafter Release No. 33-8238] (requiring that
each annual report assess the effectiveness of the internal control structure and the
issuer’s financial reporting procedures).
180
Section 404(b), supra note 15. See also 17 C.F.R. § 229.308 (2005);
HAMILTON & RASMUSSEN, supra note 15, at 12.
181
HAMILTON & RASMUSSEN, supra note 15, at 12. See also Gorman &
Stewart, supra note 140, at 156-57 (2004) (stating that the purpose of this section is to
impose a new ethical standard on the securities markets by requiring corporate
executives to take responsibility for the financial information published by their
companies).
182
HAMILTON & RASMUSSEN, supra note 15, at 12. See also Exchange Act
Release 34-49544, supra note 170; John C. Coffee, Jr., Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 and
Auditing Standard No. 2, 97 N.Y.L.J. 5 (2004) (stating that an auditor preparing an
internal controls report must conduct a complete audit of a company’s internal controls
and give an opinion on their effectiveness, not simply comment on management’s
statements).
183
HAMILTON & RASMUSSEN, supra note 15, at 17-19. “[T]he scope of internal
control extends to policies, plans, procedures, processes, systems, activities, functions,
projects, initiatives, and endeavors of all types at all levels of a company.” Id. at 19.
184
Id. at 19.
185
Release No. 33-8238, supra note 179, ¶ 87,706 (“The preparation of the
management report on internal control over financial reporting will likely involve
multiple parties, including senior management, internal auditors, in-house counsel,
outside counsel and audit committee members.”). See also HAMILTON & RASMUSSEN,
supra note 15, at 13.
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report on such things as the company’s framework for internal
control and the system used to evaluate it. 186
The auditor’s report is even more complex because it
requires the auditor to render two different opinions. 187 In
order to fulfill its obligation under Section 404, “the auditor
must evaluate both management’s process for making its
assessment and the effectiveness of internal control over
financial reporting.” 188 Therefore, the in-depth and intricate
process of evaluating management must be repeated twice. In
addition, Section 404 requires the company to retain two
different auditors – one to prepare the internal controls report
and another one to prepare the audited financial statements
that are required for the company’s annual report. 189 In order
to complete an evaluation of a company’s internal controls, the
auditor must examine the company’s financial statements. 190
Since an auditor is prohibited from auditing its own work in
order to maintain its independence, separate auditors must be
retained. 191
Simply put, preparing an internal control report to
comply with Section 404 requires a significant amount of time
and labor from many different people in different capacities
throughout a business. As a result, it is not surprising that the
costs of compliance can be substantial 192 and due to economies
186
According to the SEC, the internal control report must include:
a statement of management’s responsibility for establishing and maintaining
adequate internal control over financial reporting for the company;
management’s assessment of the effectiveness of the company’s internal
control over financial reporting as of the end of the company’s most recent
fiscal year; a statement identifying the framework used by management to
evaluate the effectiveness of the company’s internal control over financial
reporting; and a statement that the registered public accounting firm that
audited the company’s financial statements included in the annual report has
issued an attestation report on management’s assessment of the company’s
internal control over financial reporting.
Release No. 33-8238, supra note 179, ¶ 87,676.
187
HAMILTON & RASMUSSEN, supra note 15, at 25.
188
Id. at 20.
189
Id. at 67 (“Auditors must not audit their own work.”).
190
Id. at 81 (“Because of the potential significance of the information obtained
during the audit of the financial statements to the auditor’s conclusions about the
effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, the auditor cannot audit
internal control over financial reporting without also auditing the financial
statements.”).
191
Id. at 67 (“This prohibition [on auditors auditing their own work] is in
keeping with the auditor independence principles of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the
SEC rules under which auditors impair their independence if they audit their own
work . . . .”).
192
See infra Part IV.C.
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of scale, these compliance costs disproportionately impact small
businesses. 193 These high relative costs to small businesses are
the most serious problem with Section 404 and the most
compelling reason for a small business exemption to its
requirements.
C.

Cost Problems with Sarbanes-Oxley and Section 404

It has been widely acknowledged that Section 404 is the
most expensive and challenging aspect of Sarbanes-Oxley. 194
While neither Congress nor the SEC expected that the new law
would not cost anything to implement, 195 the tremendous
increases in costs that have been seen beg the question of
whether the benefits of these regulations justify their costs. 196
Due to economies of scale, the costs of these regulations are
especially burdensome for small businesses. 197
A report on a company’s internal controls under Section
404 amounts to a complete evaluation of a company’s business
by both management and the company’s auditors. 198 As many
firms have seen, the costs of audit fees as well as the costs of
producing
information
to
auditors
have
increased
dramatically. 199 Since the reporting requirements are the same

193

See supra Part III.C.
See, e.g., Sox and Stocks, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2005, at A20 (“The most
notorious part of the law [Sarbanes-Oxley] is Section 404…”); Jackie Calmes &
Deborah Solomon, Snow Says “Balance” Is Needed in Enforcing Sarbanes-Oxley Law,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2004, at A1 (“Much of the Sarbanes-Oxley criticism stems from an
SEC rule based on the law that requires companies to improve their internal controls
to prevent accounting and other types of financial fraud.”); Adrian Michaels & Dan
Roberts, Compliance Brings Business Benefits, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Apr. 23, 2004, at
2 (“[Section 404] is the most expensive part of the new corporate governance laws to
implement . . . .”).
195
HAMILTON & RASMUSSEN, supra note 15, at 12 (stating that Congress
originally did not intend the auditor attestation requirements in Section 404(b) to be
“the basis for increased charges or fees”); Release No. 33-8238, supra note 179, ¶ 87,706
(“The final rules will increase costs for all reporting companies.”).
196
See, e.g., Cait Murphy, Keeping Small Business off the Street, FORTUNE,
Nov.
7,
2003,
available
at
http://www.fortune.com/fortune/print/0,15935,538294,00.html
(documenting
the
burdensome costs of compliance for small businesses).
197
See supra Part III.C.
198
See supra Part IV.B.
199
Ribstein, supra note 158, at 40 (“Post-Enron . . .regulation directly
increases firms’ costs in part by requiring them to spend more to get information. In
particular, new auditor regulation significantly increases firms’ audit fees as well as
their costs of dealing with and producing information for auditors.”). See also Deborah
Solomon & Cassell Bryan-Low, Companies Complain About Cost of CorporateGovernance Rules, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2004, at Al (describing the costs of Sarbanes194
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regardless of size, all companies have to devote significant
resources to the effort to conform to Sarbanes-Oxley’s
requirements. 200 Costs incurred by companies to rearrange and
disclose their corporate structure can be extremely oppressive,
and potentially devastating, for new and smaller companies, 201
since they often do not have an extensive infrastructure or
extra staff to absorb these new and more complex
requirements. 202 Large, established issuers, however, have
found it easier to comply with new regulations than smaller or
newer firms. 203
There have been numerous attempts to document the
increased costs of Sarbanes-Oxley compliance to small
businesses. One survey, which defined “small business” as
companies with less than $100 million in revenue, focused
exclusively on Section 404 compliance costs. 204 This survey
found that small companies expected to pay an average of
$259,500 in additional audit fees simply for the auditor
attestation report required by Section 404(b). 205 The same
study also examined increases in “vendor costs” for small
businesses, which include external consulting fees and software
charges but do not include the costs of the auditor attestation
report. 206 Small businesses in this survey expected to pay an
average of $192,000 for these vendor costs. 207 In total, this
survey found that small companies expected to pay an average
of $451,500 in additional compliance costs solely as a result of
Section 404.
In addition, the considerable costs incurred by these
new regulations are not limited to resources devoted to
Oxley in terms of out-of-pocket expenses as well as the time and attention of
management).
200
J. Michael Cook, Moving Forward – A Guide to Improving Corporate
Governance Through Effective Internal Control, available at WL 1449 PLI/Corp 1135,
1148 (Oct. 2004).
201
Peri Nielsen & Claudia Main, Company Liability After the Act SarbanesOxley, 18 No. 10 INSIGHTS 2, 4 (2004).
202
Cook, supra note 200, at 1148; Kristina Shevory, Compliance Efforts Come
with Big Accounting Bills, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 3, 2004, at E10 (“Sarbanes-related
expenses are rising for smaller companies . . . because they often have tiny accounting
staffs that don’t have the time or expertise to deal with the new rules.”).
203
Ribstein, supra note 158, at 46.
204
Financial Executives International, FEI Special Survey on Sarbanes-Oxley
Section
404
Implementation
Executive
Summary
(July
2004),
http://www.fei.org/download/SOXSurveyJuly.pdf.
205
Id.
206
Id.
207
Id.
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While direct costs such as employee and
compliance. 208
consultant time, expenditures for new technology, and
increased auditor fees for internal control testing may be more
obvious, indirect costs such as reassigning people and resources
away from other, business-specific roles can also weigh on a
company with limited resources. 209 Furthermore, the rates for
directors and officers (“D&O”) insurance 210 have skyrocketed
due to the increased responsibilities and heightened scrutiny of
directors. 211 These premiums were estimated by one attorney
to have increased “by 100% to 400%, depending on the size of
the company.” 212 As a result of these drastic increases, it has
become more difficult and more expensive to get qualified
individuals to serve as directors. 213
Overall, one survey of midsize companies found that the
average price of being a public company has almost doubled. 214
And since these costs are borne by the company itself, these
significant additional expenses are passed along to the
shareholders in the form of decreased value of their ownership
stake in the company. 215 Some of these costs, such as setting up
a technology infrastructure, will be higher at the beginning of
the process and taper off once systems are in place. There are

208

Cook, supra note 200, at 1148.
Id.
210
Directors and officers (D&O) insurance provides protection to individual
directors and officers from personal liability and financial loss arising out of their
capacity as corporate officers and/or directors. See Aon Corp., Directors and Officers
Liability Insurance, http://www.aon.com/risk_management/d_and_o.jsp (last visited
Aug. 29, 2005).
211
Richard A. Epstein, Sarbanes Overdose, NAT’L L. J., Jan. 27, 2003, at A17
(stating that independence requirements for boards and new heightened disclosure
standards have made directors’ duties much more onerous).
212
Greg Farrell, Accounting Costs Rising as Wary Companies Play It Safe,
USA TODAY, July 31, 2003, at 2B (citing George Davitt, an attorney with Testa,
Hurwitz & Thibeault in Boston). See also Robert Max Crane, Going Private
Transactions: A Serious Alternative for Small and Midsized Public Companies, 177
N.J.L.J. 406 (2004) (“[B]y all accounts, the costs of directors’ and officers’ insurance has
tripled or even quadrupled over the last year.”).
213
Epstein, supra note 211 (“As the duties become more onerous, the
willingness of individuals to serve as independent directors decreases . . . . Insurance
coverage supplied to these directors now costs more and has higher deductibles and
more exclusions.”).
214
Tamara Loomis, Costs of Compliance Soars [sic] After Sarbanes-Oxley, 229
N.Y.L.J. 1 (2003) (citing a Foley & Lardner study which found that the average annual
costs of being a public company increased from $1.3 million to $2.5 million in the year
after Sarbanes-Oxley became law).
215
Nielsen & Main, supra note 201, at 4.
209
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some significant costs that recur annually, however, such as
the auditor evaluation and attestation. 216
While the disproportionately high costs to small
businesses have been the most significant and welldocumented problem with Section 404, they are not the only
rationale that supports a small business exemption. The
legislative history of Sarbanes-Oxley demonstrates that
Congress did not adequately consider the effects of the new law
on small businesses. As a result, the law’s requirements must
be reconsidered in light of their impact on small businesses.
D.

Legislative Problems with Sarbanes-Oxley and Section
404

In the words of one SEC Administrator, “[o]ut of anger,
haste and politics came Sarbanes-Oxley.” 217 That is not to say
that reform wasn’t necessary, however. While Enron and
WorldCom were the two biggest companies to be engulfed by
scandals, scores of others were forced to restate earnings,
which led to falling stock prices and a crisis of confidence in the
markets. 218 Making matters worse was the fact that the events
in the financial markets that led up to the summer of 2002
were not unprecedented. 219 In fact, many of the fraudulent
devices seen during the frenetic bull market of the late 1990s
were simply old schemes labeled with new names. These
conspiracies included variations on the classic “pump-anddump” scheme, 220 which was reminiscent of the stock pool

216
See Shevory, supra note 202 (“The expenses won’t end when companies
become compliant . . . . Businesses will have to monitor their internal controls every
year and devote additional staff or consultant time.”); Thomas Watterson, Accountants
Riding the Sarbanes-Oxley Wave, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 10, 2004, at G7 (“[E]xternal
auditors have to go in and test the operational effectiveness of the internal control
procedures every year . . . . This work isn’t going to go away.”).
217
Tom Fowler, Five Questions with Hal Degenhardt: SEC Regional Office
Beefs Up to Fight Corporate ‘Betrayals’, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Oct. 12, 2004 (Business),
at 2 (quoting Hal Degenhardt).
218
Ribstein, supra note 158, at 7 (“Other accounting shenanigans in public
corporations include Xerox’s accelerating revenues from long-term equipment leases,
Qwest’s and Global Crossing’s manipulation of revenues and expenses on sales and
swaps of fiber optic capacity, and apparently rampant looting by the family controlling
Adelphia.”).
219
See supra Part II.
220
In a “pump-and-dump” scheme, several investors buy shares in thinly
traded companies, fraudulently inflate their price (the “pump”) in order to sell to the
public at an artificial profit (the “dump”). For an example of a modern pump-and-dump
conspiracy, see U.S. v. Benussi, 216 F.Supp. 2d 299, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d sub nom.
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schemes of the late 1920s. 221 Furthermore, the seemingly
innovative use of special purpose entities (“SPEs”) 222 and other
off-balance sheet devices by Enron 223 and others bore close
resemblance to similar practices during the late 1920s. 224
While rampant market speculation was not a new
phenomenon, 225 the fact that history had repeated itself with
such massive and widespread financial fraud at the highest
levels of business indicated that some changes needed to be
made. 226
It is widely acknowledged, however, that SarbanesOxley was created, passed and signed at a speed almost
unheard of in Washington. 227 In contrast, the Exchange Act
U.S. v. Salmonese, 352 F.3d 608 (2d Cir. 2003) (affirming conviction for conspiracy to
commit securities fraud).
221
S. REP. NO. 73-1455, at 44-45 (1934) (stating that in both cases,
manipulation of the trading volume by a small group of active traders was
accompanied by dissemination of false and overly optimistic information about the
stocks).
222
A Special Purpose Entity (“SPE”) is a “business interest formed solely in
order to accomplish some specific task or tasks. A business may utilize a special
purpose entity for accounting purposes, but these transactions must still adhere to
certain regulations.”
Investorwords.com, Special Purpose Entity Definition,
http://www.investorwords.com/5799/special_purpose_entity.html (last visited Aug. 30,
2005).
223
See supra note 9.
224
Ribstein, supra note 158, at 19 (“This is not the first time that widespread
financial chicanery has occurred in the context of rampant market speculation. For
example, some of the speculation preceding the 1929 Crash has a familiar ring. J.K.
Galbraith recounts Goldman Sachs’ launching of a series of ‘exiguous’ trading
companies whose assets consisted largely of their own stock, rose sharply with their
own value, and fell just as fast.”).
225
See CHARLES MACKAY, EXTRAORDINARY POPULAR DELUSIONS AND THE
MADNESS OF CROWDS (Wordsworth Editions Ltd. 1995) (1841) (describing the rampant
speculation that has seized markets specializing in everything from land to tulips
throughout history). See also Lerach, supra note 23, at 73 n.8 (“This was not the first
speculative bubble. The broadband boom has its match in the railway boom of the late
19th century. The Internet boom resembled the radio boom of the 1920s, when one of
the favorite stocks, RCA, went from $1 a share to almost $600 a share in just a few
years.”).
226
Neil H. Aronson, Preventing Future Enrons: Implementing the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002, 8 Stan. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 127, 132 (2002) (“Enron served as a wake-up
call for investors who realized that financial fraud threatened the very existence of a
large number of public companies and our financial market system itself.”).
227
See supra notes 152-65 and accompanying text. See also H.R. Con. Res.
139,
108th
Cong.
§
3
(2003),
available
at
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/lawsmade.bysec/lawsnew.txt (explaining that bills are
drafted by congressional committees and based on studies and hearings that often last
a year or more). Commentators have also noted the unusual speed at which SarbanesOxley became law. See, e.g., Hilzenrath, supra note 159 (stating that the convergence
of concerns over the drastic decline in the stock market and the series of admissions of
corporate malfeasance by some of the nation’s largest corporations harnessed a “perfect
storm” which enabled Sarbanes-Oxley to be ratified by both chambers of Congress in a
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was passed two years after the Pecora Hearings had begun to
illuminate the fraud and manipulation it sought to remedy. 228
Since Sarbanes-Oxley’s passage, critics have remarked that
because Congress hurried to pass the Act, it was unable to
achieve the necessary but delicate balance between the costs
and benefits of these reforms. 229 Specifically, the unique needs
and concerns of small businesses were ignored during the
According to one
abbreviated legislative process. 230
Congressman, “[s]mall business is one of the areas we could
have focused on if we hadn’t been rushed to pass this law.” 231
Furthermore, there was an almost complete absence of
small business representation during the deliberations on
Sarbanes-Oxley. The hearings held by the House Committee
on Financial Services and its Subcommittee on Capital
Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Entities to
solicit testimony on the bill did not include representatives
from small business advocacy groups. 232 This is contrary to
hearings held for other significant securities rule proposals by
the SEC. 233 Further, both the prepared testimony of the
witnesses and the questions posed to them by the members of
the Committee focused on reactions to scandals and ignored the
potential undesirable consequences of Sarbanes-Oxley, the
most serious of which have been the tremendous relative costs
that Section 404 has imposed on small businesses. 234
Together, the well-documented and tremendously
burdensome costs that Section 404 has imposed on small
businesses and the legislative apathy displayed by Congress

matter of days.); Novarese, supra note 158 (Sarbanes-Oxley was ratified after a
“lightning passage” by Congress).
228
Ribstein, supra note 158, at 47 (“[T]he law Sarbanes-Oxley amends, the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, was enacted years after the 1929 Crash, following
extensive hearings.”).
229
Id. (“[T]he hasty adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the midst of a stock
market crash was even less conducive to careful weighing of costs and benefits than the
circumstances surrounding typical legislation . . . . The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, among
other things, reversed decisions made in more deliberative settings on such important
issues as auditor independence and attorney reporting of fraud.”).
230
See Berlau, supra note 8.
231
Id. (quoting Rep. Jeff Flake (R-Ariz.)).
232
See supra notes 154-57 for examples of committee hearings which did not
include representatives from small business.
233
The SEC will typically propose a rule in a preliminary release and solicit
comments on its proposals before a final rule is adopted. See, e.g., Release No. 33-5914,
supra note 75 (proposing rules changes that would become Regulation D); Release No.
33-6389, supra note 16 (adopting final rules for Regulation D).
234
See supra Part IV.C.
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towards small business in creating Sarbanes-Oxley
demonstrate that a targeted small business exemption is
necessary for the continued growth and prosperity of small
businesses.
V.

THE CASE FOR A SMALL BUSINESS EXEMPTION TO
SARBANES-OXLEY SECTION 404

Recently, the SEC has publicly acknowledged the
serious burdens faced by small businesses in complying with
some of Sarbanes-Oxley’s requirements and taken preliminary
steps to alleviate these burdens. In December 2004, the SEC
created a taskforce to examine the effects of Sarbanes-Oxley on
smaller public companies. 235 The Securities and Exchange
Commission Advisory Committee on Smaller Public Companies
(“Advisory Committee”), as the taskforce is known, will also
make recommendations on where and how to scale back
regulations for companies based on size. 236 In announcing the
creation of the Advisory Committee, then-SEC Chairman
William Donaldson stated that he wanted to examine Section
404 in particular to see if compliance costs can be reduced for
small companies. 237
Even though the Advisory Committee is not scheduled
to make its final report until April 2006, 238 it has already
influenced the SEC’s policy regarding Section 404 and small
business.
In August 2005, the Advisory Committee
recommended that the SEC further extend the Section 404
compliance dates for small companies known as “nonaccelerated filers,” 239 and the SEC adopted the Advisory
Committee’s recommendation without alteration one month

235
Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Establishes
Advisory Committee to Examine Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Smaller Public
Companies (Dec. 16, 2004), at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-174.htm
[hereinafter Advisory Committee Release]. See also Parker, supra note 174.
236
Charter, Securities and Exchange Commission Advisory Committee on
Smaller
Public
Companies,
art.
B
(Mar.
23,
2005),
at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/acspc-charter.pdf.
See also Advisory Committee
Release, supra note 235; Calmes & Solomon, supra note 194 (“The agency is focusing
on smaller companies . . . because the cost is proportionally larger.”).
237
See Andrew Parker & David Wighton, SEC Sticks to Core Purpose, FIN.
TIMES (LONDON), Dec. 3, 2004, at 33.
238
Securities and Exchange Commission Advisory Committee on Smaller
Public
Companies,
Hearing
Schedule
(July
7,
2005),
at
http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acspc/acspc-mastersched.pdf.
239
See infra Part V.A.
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later. 240 This followed two other similar postponements by the
The Advisory Committee based its
SEC since 2004. 241
recommendation on hearings, testimony, and comments it had
received over the course of its investigation up to that point. 242
In its resolution, the Advisory Committee expressly
acknowledged that “[t]he costs of implementing Section 404
have been far more expensive than originally forecasted and
these costs are disproportionately larger for small
companies.” 243 The Advisory Committee chose not to wait for
its final report to advocate this change because “the
advisability of implementing these recommendations seemed
apparent to the Committee; further study did not seem
justified.” 244 As of October 2005, the compliance date for nonaccelerated filers stands at July 15, 2007, 245 over two years
later than the original deadline set by the SEC for Section 404
compliance. 246
While the SEC has already created a de facto exemption
with its series of postponements, there are several sound
reasons for implementing an explicit and permanent small
business exemption to Section 404 that the Advisory
Committee should examine.
First, imposing the same
corporate governance restrictions on all public companies,
regardless of their size, is illogical and impossible to justify
under a cost-benefit analysis. Not only is there a precedent for
240

Securities Act Release No. 33-8618, Exchange Act Release No. 34-52492
(Sept. 22, 2005), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8618.pdf [hereinafter Release No.
33-8618] (extending the compliance date for a non-accelerated filer to the end of its
first fiscal year ending on or after July 15, 2007).
241
Securities Act Release No. 33-8545, Exchange Act Release No. 34-51293,
[2004-2005 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 87,335 (Mar. 2, 2005)
(extending the compliance date for a non-accelerated filer to the end of its first fiscal
year ending on or after July 15, 2006); Securities Act Release No. 33-8392, Exchange
Act Release No. 34-49313, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-26357, [2003-2004
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 87,144 (Feb. 24, 2004) (extending the
compliance date for a non-accelerated filer to the end of its first fiscal year ending on or
after July 15, 2005).
242
Securities and Exchange Commission Advisory Committee on Smaller
Public Companies, Resolution Regarding Section 404 Compliance Dates For NonAccelerated
Filing
Companies
(Aug.
10,
2005),
at
http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acspc/coxacspcletter081805.pdf [hereinafter Advisory
Committee Resolution].
243
Id.
244
Letter from SEC Advisory Committee on Smaller Public Companies, to
Christopher Cox, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission (Aug. 18, 2005), at
http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acspc/coxacspcletter081805.pdf.
245
Release No. 33-8618, supra note 240.
246
Release No. 33-8238, supra note 179, ¶ 86,023 (establishing the original
compliance date for non-accelerated filers as April 15, 2005).
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creating these types of exemptions, 247 there are provisions
currently in Sarbanes-Oxley, such as the accelerated filer
provision, 248 which specifically address other small business
Unfortunately,
issues in the federal securities laws. 249
Congress and the SEC have failed to address the most
troublesome requirement of the Act – Section 404 – and the
creation of the Advisory Committee is recognition that they
have not gone far enough to alleviate the regulatory burden on
small businesses.
Second, the immense and disproportionate burden that
Section 404 imposes on small companies has restricted their
access to capital for growth. This result directly contradicts the
statutory mandate of the SEC, which is required to consider
the effects of its rules on capital formation. 250 In many cases,
Section 404 offers small companies a Hobson’s Choice of
accepting the crushing burden of federal securities regulations
that could lead to bankruptcy in order to stay public, or a slow,
suffocating existence without access to capital for growth. In
some cases there is no choice at all because Section 404 reaches
beyond the realm of publicly traded companies to influence
companies that otherwise would not be affected by the federal
securities laws. 251
Finally, any company that would qualify for the
proposed exemption from Section 404 would still be subject to
the other provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, as well as
antifraud regulations such as Rule 10b-5. 252 As a result, this
proposed exemption would not weaken or have any detrimental
effect on the federal securities laws. In fact, this proposed
exemption draws on the provisions and policies of several
existing exemptions, making it both a pragmatic and effective
solution to Section 404’s shortcomings.

247

See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
See infra Part V.A.
249
Id.
250
15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2005) (stating that whenever the Commission engages
in rulemaking, it is required to evaluate whether its action will promote capital
formation). See also 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2005) (laying out a similar provision in § 3(f) of
the Exchange Act).
251
See infra Part V.B.
252
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2005) (prohibiting the use of manipulative or
deceptive devices to defraud by any means of interstate commerce or on any national
securities exchange).
248
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Precedent for Small Business Exemptions in SarbanesOxley

Even in the current environment of heightened
sensitivity to corporate governance issues, the SEC has already
adopted rules pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley that explicitly
address the concerns and problems faced by small businesses
and provide targeted exemptions to alleviate those burdens.
For example, in the wake of Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC
shortened the amount of time that some companies have to file
their quarterly and annual reports in order to increase the
relevance and timeliness of the information in these reports. 253
These companies, which are generally larger and more
established, are called “accelerated filers.” 254 In creating this
new requirement, the SEC has also created a corresponding
exemption for companies with an aggregate market value of
less than $75 million. 255 These companies still have to file
disclosure documents such as quarterly and annual reports,
but they do not have to meet the new accelerated deadlines. 256
In a release describing these accelerated filing deadlines, the
SEC acknowledged that costs would likely increase for
companies to comply with the accelerated filer requirements,
and as a result, the Commission only imposed the new
requirement on more seasoned public companies. 257
The facts surrounding the accelerated filer provision
support an exemption from Section 404 for small businesses for
253

Release No. 33-8128, supra note 137.
17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2005) (defining “accelerated filer” as “an issuer after
it first meets the following conditions as of the end of its fiscal year: (i) The aggregate
market value of the voting and non-voting common equity held by non-affiliates of the
issuer is $ 75 million or more; (ii) The issuer has been subject to the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Act for a period of at least twelve calendar months; (iii)
The issuer has filed at least one annual report pursuant to Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Act; and (iv) The issuer is not eligible to use Forms 10-KSB and 10-QSB for its annual
and quarterly reports.”) (citations omitted).
255
17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2005). See also Release No. 33-8238, supra note
179.
256
See Release No. 33-8238, supra note 179.
257
Release No. 33-8128, supra note 137 (“Although we believe investors in
less large or unseasoned companies may want and benefit from more timely disclosures
just as much as investors in larger, listed companies, we are concerned that this may
impose undue burden and expense on these companies. Smaller companies are likely to
be more sensitive to any increased costs in preparing their reports. These entities may
not have the infrastructure and resources available or necessary to prepare their
reports on a shorter timeframe. Accordingly, we are only shortening the filing
deadlines for companies with a minimum public float or reporting history as
proposed.”).
254
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two reasons. First, they demonstrate the importance of costbenefit analysis in the SEC rulemaking process. The Exchange
Act explicitly prohibits the SEC from adopting any rule that
places an undue burden on competition and requires the SEC
to state its cost-benefit justification for its rules. 258 To that end,
in its release announcing the accelerated filer rule, the SEC
included an extensive section describing the cost-benefit
analysis it undertook in creating the rule. The SEC explained
that the benefits of the rule, such as more meaningful
disclosure to investors, would outweigh the costs of getting
information to investors faster. 259 To be consistent, the SEC
should also apply this measure of efficiency in evaluating the
application of Section 404 to small businesses. As described in
Part III.C and IV.C, imposing Section 404 on all companies
universally, regardless of their size, fails a cost-benefit test
because of economies of scale in the costs of compliance. 260
Second, the accelerated filer exemption implicitly
acknowledges that Sarbanes-Oxley will need to be adjusted for
the unique concerns of small businesses. As described in Part
IV.D, in Congress’s zeal to combat fraud and provide investors
with the best information possible, it largely ignored the
disproportionate impact its proposals would have on small
This acknowledgement has been explicitly
businesses. 261
reinforced by the SEC’s recent formation of the Advisory
Committee on Smaller Public Companies. 262
B.

Less Participation by Small Business in the Public
Capital Markets

As foreshadowed by one commentator, 263 another side
effect of Sarbanes-Oxley has been a trend of small, public
companies going private 264 or deregistering 265 to avoid some of
258

Exchange Act § 23(a)(2) (codified in 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(1) (2005)).
Release No. 33-8128, supra note 137.
260
See supra Part IV.
261
See supra Part IV.D.
262
See supra Part V; see also Parker, supra note 174; Advisory Committee
Release, supra note 235.
263
Ribstein, supra note 158, at 39 (“Moreover, a trend toward going-private
transactions could reduce the available investment options. The effect might be
exacerbated if going-private transactions were concentrated in particular industries
that will have particularly high liability and auditing costs under Sarbanes-Oxley.”).
264
When a company “goes private,” it or a controlling group eliminates all or
substantially all of the company’s publicly held shares. This is usually done through a
tender offer, exchange offer, reverse stock split or merger. Going private transactions
259
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the more costly requirements of the law. 266 In the first full year
after Sarbanes-Oxley was passed, 198 companies deregistered,
while the following year in 2004, another 134 followed suit. 267
This was a sharp increase over the 67 companies in 2002 and
43 companies in 2001 that deregistered. 268 Given the law’s
intent to restore investors’ confidence in the market and
encourage their continued investment, this effect has been
ironic. 269 This trend is important and disturbing because of the
importance of the public securities markets to small business
growth. 270
Being publicly traded enables businesses to grow in two
271
It not only allows companies to raise capital by selling
ways.
securities, but also enables them to use their stock as currency
to merge with and acquire other companies. 272 In the past,
these substantial benefits outweighed the burden and costs of
being a public company. Since the costs of being public have
increased so drastically, many businesses have decided that it
is not worth the trouble. 273 As a result, more companies are
are more complicated and expensive than deregistration. See David Alan Miller &
Marci J. Frankenthaler, Delisting/Deregistration of Securities Under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 17 NO. 10 INSIGHTS 7, 7 (Oct. 2003).
265
When a company deregisters or delists, it is no longer required to file
various disclosure reports with the SEC or to comply with the SEC rules implementing
Sarbanes-Oxley. Id.
266
See Farrell, supra note 212 (citing a Grant Thorton report that found there
had been a 26% increase between 2002 and 2003 in companies going private); Peter
Loftus, Delistings Surge After Sarbanes-Oxley, Study Finds, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2004,
at B3 (describing a study of firms that deregistered in 2003 that found “most of the
companies that deregistered their shares say they did so to escape the steep costs
associated with regulatory filings”).
267
Amy Feldman, What Does Sarbanes-Oxley Mean for Companies That Want
to Go Public?, INC. MAGAZINE, Sept. 2005, at 138 (describing a study conducted by the
Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania).
268
Id.
269
Claudia H. Deutsche, The Higher Price of Staying Public, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
23, 2005, § 3 at 5 (stating that while being intended to promote additional corporate
transparency, Sarbanes-Oxley is inducing some companies to become less transparent);
William D. Holyoak, Corporate Reform: Can Utah’s Small Public Companies Survive
Sarbanes-Oxley?, UTAH BUS., June 1, 2003, at 42 (“[I]t certainly is ironic that a law
born of corruption at some of the country’s largest public companies may end up
incapacitating many small-cap companies.”); Ribstein, supra note 158, at 39 (stating
that a trend toward companies going private “would be ironic in light of the law’s
[Sarbanes-Oxley’s] intent to lure investors back into the market”).
270
Romano, supra note 40, at 1589 (stating that although difficult to quantify,
the costs associated with the decrease in financing opportunities for small businesses
could be substantial).
271
See Crane, supra note 212, at 406.
272
Id.
273
Deutsche, supra note 269 (stating that some companies would rather use
their time and money to grow their businesses than spend it on compliance).
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removing themselves from the requirements of being public by
deregistering or going private.
The recent trend in companies leaving the public
markets has been largely attributed to the new Sarbanes-Oxley
requirements, 274 and specifically to Section 404. 275 For example,
another study examined the 198 firms that deregistered in
2003 and found that most of them did so because of the
extreme costs associated with the regulations. 276 In addition,
numerous recent articles have documented anecdotal evidence
that small public companies are fleeing the public markets in
droves because of stifling compliance costs. 277 As a result of
these costs, more and more companies are trading some of their
long-term growth potential for short-term solvency. 278
Furthermore, while Sarbanes-Oxley is the law for most
public companies, small businesses do not have to be public
companies for Sarbanes-Oxley to affect them. 279 Companies
only need to consider the prospect of becoming public for these
overly burdensome requirements to chill their plans to seek
public financing. 280 While there are no statistics kept on the
number of private companies that eschew public financing or
why they do so, there has been increasing anecdotal evidence
that fewer private companies are considering going public

274

Loftus, supra note 266.
Susan Greco, Is Life Really Better Without Sarbanes-Oxley and Quarterly
Earnings Calls? Three Public Companies That Went Private Say Yes, D & O ADVISOR,
Jan. 1, 2005, at 20 (“Things like Section 404 push more companies to want to go
private . . . .”).
276
Loftus, supra note 266.
277
See, e.g., Angus Loten, Sarbox No Picnic for Teddy Bear Maker, INC.
MAGAZINE,
Oct.
5,
2005,
available
at
http://www.inc.com/criticalnews/
articles/200510/bears.html (describing the extensive costs and burdens placed on the
Vermont Teddy Bear Company by Section 404); Laurence B. Beckler, Outside Counsel;
Deregistering with the Securities and Exchange Commission, 231 N.Y.L.J. 4 (2004);
Deutsche, supra note 269; Greco, supra note 275; Melinda Ligos, When Going Public
May Not Be Worth It, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2004, at C7.
278
See Murphy, supra note 196 (documenting the burdensome costs of
compliance for small businesses).
279
Amy Feldman, Surviving Sarbanes-Oxley, INC. MAGAZINE, Sept. 2005, at
132 (quoting Mark Jensen, national director of VC services for the San Jose, Calif.,
office of Deloitte & Touche: “Unless you are a 100% family-owned business and 100%
self-financed, you’re going to be impacted by Sarbanes-Oxley.”).
280
See Peter H. Ehrenberg & Anthony O. Pergola, Why Private Companies
Should Not Ignore the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, WALL STREET LAW., Dec. 2002, at 12
(stating that private companies that are considering accessing the public markets
should consider the costs of complying with Sarbanes-Oxley); Greco, supra note 275
(stating that a company that is thinking about going public or being acquired by a
public company may adopt Section 404-type controls).
275
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because of Sarbanes-Oxley compliance costs. 281 It is also
noteworthy that some of the other hurdles that companies
would have to overcome in order to sell securities to the public
are relatively low. For example, notwithstanding several
shareholder-specific requirements, a company need only have
$1 million of annual income before taxes and a share price of
five dollars in order to list on the NASDAQ National Market, 282
and the threshold is even lower for the NASDAQ Small Cap
Market. 283
C.

Antifraud Provisions of the Securities Laws Still Apply

As important as what a small business exemption to
Section 404 would do is what an exemption would not do. Any
small business exemption to Section 404 would not compromise
the goals of investor protection and fraud prevention, which are
at the heart of Sarbanes-Oxley and all of the federal securities
laws. 284 All exemptions, including Regulation D, require that
companies still comply with the antifraud provisions of the
federal securities laws, 285 including Section 17(a) of the
Securities Act 286 and Rule 10b-5, 287 the chief anti-fraud
provision promulgated under the Exchange Act. 288
In addition, Sarbanes-Oxley has already increased the
deterrent component of the existing antifraud rules by
significantly increasing the criminal penalties attached to
them. For example, criminal penalties for violations of the
Exchange Act, under which Rule 10b-5 is promulgated, have
been increased to $5 million in fines and twenty years in prison
281

See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 196.
NASDAQ Marketplace Rule 4420(a)(1).
283
In order to qualify for an initial listing on the NASDAQ Small Cap Market,
a company must have net income from continuing operations of at least $750,000 in the
latest fiscal year or two of the last three fiscal years. NASDAQ Listing Standards and
Fees, March 2005, http://www.nasdaq.com/about/nasdaq_listing_req_fees.pdf.
284
STEINBERG, supra note 85, at 1.
285
Release No. 33-6389, supra note 16 (discussing Preliminary Note 1, which
states that Regulation D does not exempt issuers from the antifraud or civil liability
provisions of the federal securities laws); see also Bradford, Exemptions, supra note 78,
at 609.
286
15 U.S.C. § 77q (2005).
287
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2005).
288
J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Irrelevance of State Corporate Law in the
Governance of Public Companies, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 317, 318 n.6 (2004) (describing
Rule 10b-5 as the “most significant antifraud provision” of the federal securities laws);
Robert A. Prentice, The Future of Corporate Disclosure: The Internet, Securities Fraud,
and Rule 10b-5, 47 EMORY L.J. 1, 4 (1998) (stating that Rule 10b-5 is the “most
significant antifraud securities provision in the world”).
282
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for individuals. 289 In addition, any person who knowingly alters
or destroys documents in order to obstruct an investigation can
be sentenced to up to twenty years in prison. 290 Furthermore,
each incidence of mail and wire fraud is now punishable by up
to twenty years in prison as well. 291 These severe penalties
serve as powerful deterrents to securities fraud on their own
and operate independently of the management reporting
requirement of Section 404.
There is a common sense aspect to this argument as
well.
The corporate misconduct that was committed at
companies like Enron and WorldCom was criminal before
Sarbanes-Oxley. 292 If a corporate officer or director had no
qualms about violating existing rules against fraud and
manipulation, then it is doubtful that simply adding another
report to complete would have any more of an effect on his or
her behavior. 293 On the other hand, the threat of twenty years
in prison and a $5 million fine for each incident of securities
fraud will serve as a much more powerful deterrent for
wrongdoing than the additional reporting requirements of
Section 404. 294
D.

The Proposed Exemption

For the reasons stated above, a small business
exemption to Section 404 must be created in order to protect
the continued growth and prosperity of the nation’s small
businesses. While the Advisory Committee could recommend
action by either Congress or the SEC, 295 the language of the
289

Sarbanes-Oxley § 1106(1) (codified in 18 U.S.C. § 1513 (2005)).
Sarbanes-Oxley § 802(a) (codified in 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2005)).
291
Sarbanes-Oxley §§ 903(a)-(b) (codified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2005)).
292
Karmel, supra note 12, at 133 (“The financial misreporting at Enron,
Adelphia, WorldCom, and elsewhere was already illegal, indeed criminal.”).
293
Douglas M. Branson, Enron – When All Systems Fail: Creative Destruction
or Roadmap to Corporate Governance Reform?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 989, 1008 (2003)
(“Corporate codes of conduct have been around for approximately twenty years. Enron
had a code. Codes can serve to raise the level of ethical behavior within an
organization, but only if they are taken seriously and enforced.”).
294
Andrew Hill, Scandals Are Nothing New To Wall Street, FIN. TIMES
(LONDON), Aug. 12, 2002, at 32 (“[I]t has taken the threat of criminal litigation to
persuade the firms they need to take more radical action than they originally
suggested was necessary.”).
295
It is not clear if such an exemption can be created by the SEC or if
Congress would have to amend the statute. While Section 404 gives the SEC explicit
power to make rules regarding the internal control reports that a company must file as
part of its annual report, Section 404 does not give the SEC explicit exemptive
authority. This is in contrast to other exemptions that are based on explicit statutory
290
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release that announced the creation of the Advisory Committee
indicates that the SEC presumes to have the power to make
these rule changes. 296 A complete analysis of the SEC’s
rulemaking and exemptive authority, however, is beyond the
scope of this note.
The main provision of this proposed exemption would
allow a company to file its management report on internal
controls without the independent auditor’s attestation report
that is required by Section 404(b). In addition, officers and
directors of companies eligible for the exemption would not be
subject to the enhanced criminal penalties for filing a false or
misleading certification under Section 404.
In order to be eligible for this proposed small business
exemption, a company would have to have a public float 297 of
less than $75 million, as measured on the last day of the
company’s most recent fiscal year. This size threshold is the
same as in the accelerated filer exemption as well as other

authority, such as Regulation D (promulgated under § 3(b) of the Securities Act).
There is a precedent, however, for the SEC exercising exemptive rulemaking power
without specific statutory authority. Pursuant to the Williams Act (Pub. L. No. 90-439,
82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (2005))),
which protects securities holders from unfair and deceptive practices in tender offers,
the SEC created Rule 14d-8, which provides an exemption for bidders in a tender offer.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8 (2005). See also AARON RACHELSON, CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS,
MERGERS AND DIVESTITURES § 8:21 (2005) (describing the exemption created by Rule
14d-8). Rule 14d-8, however, was adopted as part of § 14d-6 of the Exchange Act (15
U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (2005)), which does not grant specific exemptive authority to the
Commission. Instead, the SEC relied on its authority under a different section of the
Williams Act to adopt Rule 14d-8. In doing so, the Commission acknowledged that it
had technically exceeded its authority under § 14d-6 but asserted that its expanded
power was justified based on necessity and the intent of Congress. Exchange Act
Release No. 34-18761, [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 83,221 (May
25, 1982) (describing the SEC’s rationale for its authority to adopt Rule 14d-8). See
also William C. Tyson, The Williams Act After Hanson Trust v. SCM Corporation:
Post-Tender Offer Purchases by the Tender Offeror, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1, 6 n.32 (1982)
(describing the SEC’s questionable authority to adopt Rule 14d-8). In that case, the
Commission also relied on its general rulemaking power granted by § 23(a) of the
Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(1) (2005) (granting the SEC the power to make rules
and regulations to implement provisions of the Exchange Act).
296
Advisory Committee Release, supra note 235 (“[T]he Commission expects
the committee to provide recommendations as to where and how the Commission
should draw lines to scale regulatory treatments for companies based on size.”)
(emphasis added).
297
A company’s float is the market value of the company’s equity shares
outstanding. This number is calculated by multiplying the number of shares
outstanding by the market price of the shares. Investorwords.com, Public Float
Definition, at http://www.investorwords.com/3936/public_float.html (last visited Aug.
30, 2005).
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significant securities regulations, 298 and this consistency will
simplify one aspect of the notoriously complex federal securities
laws. 299 By measuring the company’s float at the end of the
fiscal year, this proposal is also consistent with the standard
established in the accelerated filer provision. 300 In addition, the
SEC has already explained that the public float test serves as a
“reasonable measure of company size and market interest.” 301
The SEC also established that this threshold, which excludes
nearly half of all publicly traded companies and all the
companies eligible for the SEC’s small business reporting
system from the accelerated filer provision, forms a group of
companies worthy of an exemption based on their size. 302 It is
therefore likely that the SEC would consider this group
deserving of an exemption from the high relative costs of
Section 404 as well.
This proposed exemption would be effective because it
addresses several of the key issues that have plagued small
businesses while continuing to protect investors. First, it
eliminates several significant costs associated with Section 404
compliance. An eligible small company would be able to forego
an additional costly review of its entire business every year by
an independent auditor. Furthermore, by exempting directors
and officers at eligible companies from the harsh penalties
associated with Section 404, D&O insurance providers could
lower premiums on policies for directors and officers of small
companies. As described in Part IV.C, D&O insurance costs
have skyrocketed in response to the new requirements of
Section 404. As a result of this exemption, directors and
officers could obtain the insurance coverage they need without
sacrificing protection or incurring exorbitant premiums.
Second, since many of the federal securities laws would
still apply to these companies, the actual terms of the proposed
provision would more accurately be described as a “partial
298
17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2005) (defining “accelerated filer”). See also Release
Nos. 33-6383 & 33-6964, supra note 128 (describing Form S-3 for registration
statements).
299
This rationale was also cited by the SEC in its adoption of the $75 million
float threshold for the accelerated filer provision. Release No. 33-8128, supra note 137
(“In identifying companies that will be subject to this new requirement, we also
thought it would be appropriate to use a pre-existing threshold to reduce regulatory
complexity.”).
300
Release No. 33-8128, supra note 137, ¶ 86,185.
301
Id. (adopting amendments to the SEC’s rules and forms to accelerate the
filing of quarterly and annual reports under the Exchange Act).
302
Id.
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exemption.” As in Regulation D, all the antifraud provisions of
the federal securities laws would still apply to a company
eligible for this exemption. As stated above, the current rules
provide the SEC with powerful antifraud tools and newly
enhanced criminal penalties for securities fraud, which are
both effective deterrents and adequate punishment for
wrongdoers. The proposed exemption would only exempt
managers from the enhanced criminal penalties for violations
of Section 404, not for securities fraud. Therefore, the SEC’s
enforcement capability would not be weakened in any way by
this proposal. In addition, under this proposal, companies that
fall below the $75 million public float threshold would still be
required to submit a management report on internal controls,
but the report would not have to be certified by independent
auditors. As a result, investors would still receive the standard
types of disclosure information from the company’s
management, such as audited financial statements. 303
Finally, companies eligible for this proposed exemption
would still have incentives to create sound, effective corporate
governance practices. Doing so would give a company a solid
corporate governance foundation and make it easier for that
company to eventually comply with Section 404 if and when it
outgrows the small business exemption. In addition, even
though this proposed exemption would allow a company to
remain public without fully complying with Section 404, there
is no guarantee that investors will continue to commit capital
to a company without proof of its solid financial standing and
sound management practices. Since the goal of this proposed
exemption is to allow small companies to continue to access the
public capital markets, any eligible company that neglected to
take its corporate governance responsibilities seriously would
violate the spirit and purpose of the exemption, and probably
induce a precipitous drop in that company’s stock price.
Companies that did effectively use the exemption, however,
would benefit by continuing to expand through access to the
public capital markets without exorbitant compliance costs
strangling their profits and their ability to grow. 304

303

SEC Form 10-K, 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (2005).
Neal L. Wolkoff, Chairman & CEO, American Stock Exchange, SarbanesOxley Is a Curse for Small-Cap Companies, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 2005, at A13 (“We
need to implement regulations that allow [small companies] to compete, not kill them
off with red tape.”).
304
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CONCLUSION

The federal securities laws provide the essential
regulatory framework for the financial markets and the
economy as a whole. The recent scandals at Enron and
elsewhere demonstrate that their protections are needed now
as much as ever, and Sarbanes-Oxley has modernized and
strengthened those protections for the twenty-first century.
That need for protection, however, must be balanced with the
objective of promoting economic growth.
Accordingly, the federal securities laws have evolved
over the years to include exemptions such as Regulation D to
fine-tune securities regulations and alleviate some of the high
relative costs to small businesses which result from economies
of scale. Currently, there is no provision in the federal
securities laws that imposes a more disproportionate burden on
small businesses than Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404.
By forming the Advisory Committee on Smaller Public
Companies, the SEC has taken an important first step in a
much-needed reevaluation of Sarbanes-Oxley and its effects on
small businesses. While the Advisory Committee will have to
examine the balance between the costs and benefits of the new
regulations, it is clear that Section 404 does not strike an
appropriate balance between these costs and benefits for small
businesses. As a result, a small business exemption from
Section 404 is both necessary and long overdue.
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The small business exemption proposed in this note
addresses some of the main problems with the current state of
the law, most importantly the high relative costs to small
businesses and their impact on businesses’ access to capital.
The proposal is based on the reasoning and concepts behind
two existing exemptions and incorporates aspects of both to
create a practical and effective exemption that successfully
balances the investor protection and capital formation goals of
the federal securities laws. This proposal also draws on the
effectiveness of other recent corporate governance reforms,
including strengthened antifraud laws. These reforms provide
an important safety net that would enable this exemption to
function effectively while continuing to serve the important
policy goals of Sarbanes-Oxley. The positive effects of such an
exemption would extend beyond small businesses and have a
beneficial impact on the economy as a whole.
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